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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is DefendantlRespondentiCross-Appellant Valley County's (the "County") response 
brief. It responds to Appellant's BrieJ(hereinafter "Appellants' Brief') filed by Appellants 
Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively, "Buckskin,,).l It also 
serves as the County's opening brief on cross-appeal. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Buckskin seeks to frame this case as being about illegal impact fees, but it is more 
accurately described as a collateral attack on a permit issued by the County for real estate 
development. Buckskin seeks the return of money it paid years ago toward road improvements 
pursuant to its agreement with the County in connection with Phases 2 and 3 of a residential 
project known as The Meadows at West Mountain ("The Meadows"). The County used that 
money, along with funds from other developers, to construct roads serving the developments, 
without which The Meadows and other projects probably could not have been built. Having 
received the benefit of its bargain, Buckskin now contends that the money it agreed to pay was 
an illegal tax under Idaho law and, therefore, was a per se taking under state and federallaw.2 
Buckskin also seeks declaratory relief to the same effect in an effort to bar future payments on 
the remaining three phases of the project. It seeks this despite the fact that the County adopted a 
resolution foregoing such fees. 
At the time of Buckskin's application for a conditional use permit ("CUP"), the proposed 
project was located within a rural area served by gravel roads that were not intended for urban-
type residential development. The County could have denied the application outright, Idaho 
I Buckskin Properties, Inc. was the initial developer of the property. Timberline Development, LLC is the 
assignee/successor in interest of Buckskin Properties, Inc. 
2 Buckskin has not alleged an independent basis for a regulatory taking. Instead, its state and federal taking 
claims are entirely dependent on its allegation of an illegal tax in violation of Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6. 
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Code § 67-6512(a), or controlled the timing ofthe development, Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(2), on 
the basis of inadequate transportation infrastructure. Instead, at the behest of many developers at 
the time who were clamoring to move forward with projects in areas underserved by road 
infrastructure, the County developed a Capital Improvement Program ("CIP"). The CIP gave 
developers whose projects would otherwise have been denied or delayed the opportunity to move 
forward based on a program in which they contributed their fair share to fund road improvements 
serving their developments. 
Buckskin, like many others, took advantage ofthis program and benefited from it. 
Indeed, Buckskin included in its own CUP application a proposed agreement for it to contribute 
toward road improvements based on the CIP program. The County approved Buckskin's 
application with a condition that it enter into such a development agreement for each phase. On 
the same day, Buckskin executed the first of these agreements, the Capital Contribution 
Agreement, covering Phase 1 of the project. In it, Buckskin agreed to convey right-of-way to the 
County as its contribution toward its share of road construction costs. The value of the right-of-
way exceeded the amount due, so it obtained a credit for future phases. It later entered into a 
Road Development Agreement for Phases 2 & 3, providing for payment of $232, 160. These are 
referred to collectively the "Development Agreements.,,3 Herrick Aff., Exhs. 1 and 2.4 
Buckskin is not seeking return ofthe conveyance it made for Phase 1, acknowledging 
that this occurred outside of the statute of limitations. Instead, its lawsuit seeks (1) damages for 
the money it paid in connection with Phases 2 & 3 and (2) declaratory relief, partiCUlarly as to 
future phases. 
3 There is no significant functional difference between the Capital Contribution Agreement and the Road 
Development Agreement. The different names merely reflect an evolution in naming convention. 
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The County seeks dismissal of the action for a variety of jurisdictional, procedural, 
substantive, and equitable reasons. Most notably, the lawsuit is too late (both as to the 28-day 
appeal clock and the four-year statute oflimitations). In addition, Buckskin failed to exhaust its 
remedies and entered into the Development Agreements voluntarily. Other defenses apply 
specifically to the federal takings claim (failure to plead 42 U.S.C. § 1983, special ripeness tests 
under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,473 
U.S. 172 (1985), and the two-year statute oflimitations). Finally, the County has raised 
equitable defenses to both state and federal claims. 
While this case was pending (but after the District Court had ruled in the County's favor), 
the County enacted Resolution 11-6. This resolution declared in section 2: "In order to avoid 
litigation costs and uncertainty, the Board of County Commissioners will no longer enter into 
Road Development Agreements calling for the payment of fees or other contributions for off-site 
road improvements until such time as the County adopts an IDIF A-compliant ordinance, unless 
the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any objection thereto."s R. Vol. III, pp. 552-
53. Although the County believes it is on firm constitutional footing with its actions, it sought 
through the resolution to avoid further controversy and conflict. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The District Court granted the County's summary judgment motion. First, it dismissed 
Buckskin's federal taking claim for failure to plead § 1983. It then dismissed Buckskin's 
remaining claims as untimely under the four-year statute oflimitations. In dictum, the District 
Court rejected some of the County's other defenses. Other defenses were not addressed. 
4 The Affidavit of Cynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Herrick Aff. ") is an 
exhibit to the Clerk's Record on Appeal. 
5 IDIFA refers to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. 
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In response to Buckskin's Motion/or Reconsideration/Amendment (R. Vol. III, p. 513), 
the District Court explained that The Meadows is one project subject to a single CUP governing 
all phases, that the substantial impairment of Buckskin's property was apparent as to all phases 
from the outset, and that the cause of action for all phases therefore accrued at once when this 
obligation first became apparent. The District Court further ruled that, in any event, Buckskin's 
request for declaratory relief as to future phases 4, 5, and 6 was mooted by Resolution 11-6. The 
District Court did not comment on the County's alternative argument that claims as to such· 
future phases are not yet ripe. R. Vol. III, p. 577. 
The merits of Buckskin's lawsuit (whether the Development Agreements were a 
permissible means of addressing inadequate infrastructure or illegal taxes) is not now before the 
Court.6 Indeed, the County has been careful to reserve that question. 7 This case was disposed of 
on the County's motion which was limited to specified defenses. Valley County's Brie/in 
Support o/Motion/or Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, p. 38). Notwithstanding anything the 
District Court may have said in its decision, the merits of this case have never been briefed, 
argued, or presented. If the County's statute of limitations and other defenses are rejected, the 
County is prepared to, and must be afforded an opportunity to address the legality of its actions. 
The County is not hiding from the merits. The County should prevail on the merits. The 
County simply elected to frame its summary judgment motion on the basis of defenses that it 
6 The "merits" were addressed by the County only in the context of its argument that the payments were 
voluntary and therefore were not a taking. The "merits" of whether the road fees were an illegal tax in the ftrst place 
has never been presented or addressed by the County until this brief. 
7 "But there is no need to determine whether the Conditional Use Permit ('CUP') or the preliminary 
Development Agreement, proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, [mal Capital Contribution Agreement, and/or 
Road Development Agreement (collectively 'Agreements') at issue here imposed illegal taxes. The question 
presented in the pending motion is whether Plaintiffs proposed and/or entered into the Agreements without 
objection, accepted the CUP without complaint, avoided opportunities to raise the issue administratively, and waited 
too long to challenge." Valley County's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. Vol. III, p. 
449). 
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thought would more easily dispose of the matter. Notwithstanding the County's reservation, the 
District Court commented on the merits. Accordingly, it is now wise for the County to address 
the subject, as it has in section VIII at page 40. We leave it to the Court to determine whether it 
is necessary or appropriate to reach those merits now. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For the convenience of the Court, the key facts are set out in a time1ine attached to this 
brief as Appendix A. The appendix notes where each of the key documents may be found in the 
record. It also explains some minor discrepancies as to dates, none of which are of consequence. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL 
In addition to the issues identified in Appellants' Brief, the County identifies these issues: 
1. Was Buckskin's federal claim properly dismissed? 
2. Was there no taking in any event because Buckskin's action was voluntary? 
3. Did Buckskin fail to exhaust its administrative and judicial remedies? 
4. Should attorney fees be awarded to Valley County? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL 
The County seeks reversal of the denial of attorney fees by the District Court. It also 
seeks attorney fees on this appeal. The basis of the County's claims and its objection to 
Buckskin's claim for attorney fees is set out in section X at page 46. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BUCKSKIN'S FEDERAL TAKING CLAIM WAS IMPROPERLY PLED, UNRIPE UNDER 
WILLIAMSON COUNTY, AND, IN ANY EVENT, UNTIMELY. 
Buckskin pled its takings claim under both the federal and state constitutions. Buckskin's 
federal claim is not properly before the Court because (1) Buckskin failed to bring the claim 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 and (2) even if it had done so or were excused from doing so, the 
federal claim is subject to a two-year statute oflimitations,9 which it clearly missed. 10 In 
addition, Buckskin's suit fails both ofthe specialized ripeness tests established by Williamson 
County.II 
81t is well settled in the Ninth Circuit that so-called Bivens actions (after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971» brought directly under the U.S. Constitution are 
impermissible where a § 1983 action is available. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704,705 (9th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir 1998); 
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
1041 (2004 and 2005) (two petitions for certiorari denied). 
9 Federal law dictates which statute oflimitations is applicable to federal claims and when that statute will 
begin to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896, 
899 (2008). All § 1983 actions are subject to the state's statute oflimitations for personal injury (aka torts). Wilson 
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). On numerous occasions, Idaho courts have applied Wilson and held that 
Idaho's two-year statute oflimitations (Idaho Code § 5-219(4» applies, regardless of the nature of the § 1983 claim. 
McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896,899 (2008); Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456, 458, 958 P.2d 
1142,1144 (1998); Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128 Idaho 794, 798, 919 P.2d 323,327 (1996); Mason v. Tucker and 
Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 436,871 P.2d 846,853 (Ct. App. 1994); Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1016, 729 P.2d 
1075, 1079 (Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 310-11, 715 P.2d 978,980-81 (1986). 
Moreover, courts have held that even if a Bivens action were available, the personal injury statute of 
limitations applies in any event. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (direct takings claim 
subject to two-year statute); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman in Ninth Circuit 
in non-takings case). Thus, application of the two-year statute oflimitations to the federal claims is inescapable. 
10 Under federal law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the constitutional wrong becomes or 
should have become apparent. "Federal law, however, determines when the state limitations period begins for a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A federal claim is generally considered to accrue when the plaintiff 'knows or has 
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. '" Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F .2d 
1143,1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the right to sue is no excuse. "Her tardiness therefore 
was due not to the lack of a viable cause of action, but rather to an ignorance of her right to sue. Such ignorance is 
not a legally sufficient excuse for a delay in filing a claim." Moore v. Exxon Transportation Co., 502 F. Supp. 583 
(E.D. Vir. 1980) (dealing with tardy amendment of complaint; statute oflimitations applied by analogy; not barred 
by laches due to lack of prejudice). "The phrase 'reasonably should have been discovered' refers to knowledge of 
the facts upon which the claim is based, not knowledge of the applicable legal theory upon which a claim could be 
based." BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA 11"),141 Idaho 168, 174, 108 P.3d 315, 321 (2004) (in 
context of notice required under Idaho Tort Claims Act). Although the federal claim would not have yet been ripe in 
federal court under Williamson County, it was plainly ripe in state court under San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005) ("With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening 
[that is, those claims barred from federal court under Williamson County], we reject petitioners' contention that 
Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state courts."). If the federal claim is 
ripe in state court, it follows that the statute of limitations is running-and has now run. 
II These are not traditional Article III or prudential ripeness tests, by the way, but special tests for federal 
takings claims. Frankly, they sound more like exhaustion, but the Supreme Court has made clear that they are not. 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193. 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-ApPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1332095_34,10915·9 
Page 12 
First, the claim must be ripe in the sense that the would-be plaintiff has availed itself of 
all opportunities to obtain relief at the administrative level. This is referred to as the "final 
decision" requirement. 12 Second, the plaintiff must utilize available state judicial remedies for 
inverse condemnation. By failing to bring a timely state inverse condemnation action, the 
plaintiff forfeits its federal taking claim. 13 For the reasons set out in the footnotes, Buckskin fails 
both the "final decision" and the "state remedies" tests. The District Court dismissed the federal 
claim on the basis of failure to plead § 1983, without addressing the others. Memorandum 
Decision at 4 (R. Vol. III, p. 489). 
II. BUCKSKIN'S STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY BUCKSKIN'S FAILURE TO 
SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
A. The County's decisions concerning Buckskin's application were 
appealable under LLUPA. 
Since 1975, the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") has authorized judicial review 
of certain permitting decisions-including CUPs and final plats-identified in Idaho Code 
§§ 67-6519 and 67-6521(1).14 LLUPA, in tum, references and relies on the judicial review 
provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA"), Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
12 While Williamson County dealt with the failure to seek a variance, the holding is equally applicable to 
Buckskin's failure to question the County's CIP or request approval without a development agreement. In other 
words, plaintiffs must raise and press their objections with the local government in a timely and meaningful way in 
order to set up their claim that the exaction is involuntary. Buckskin did just the opposite. It actually proposed these 
conditions in its own CUP application. Accordingly, there is no "final decision" in the sense of Williamson County. 
13 Although Buckskin filed a state inverse condemnation action (this very lawsuit), it filed too late. It 
should have appealed under LLUP A within 28 days. Idaho Code §§ 67-6519(4) and 67-6521(1)(d). Even if a 
collateral action outside of LLUP A is permissible, it should have filed its collateral action within four years. By 
failing to file a timely takings action under state law, it forfeited its federal taking claim, too. "[W]hile the 
Williamson County requirements typically reveal a claim to be premature, they may also reveal that a claim is barred 
from the federal forum. The Williamson County 'ripeness' requirements will never be met in this case, because the 
state statute of limitations has run on Pascoag's inverse condemnation claim. By failing to bring its state claim 
within the statute of limitations period, Pascoagforfeited its federal claim." Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. 
Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted, emphasis original). 
14 References in this brief will be made to the language of the statute in effect at the relevant time prior to 
its amendment last year, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175. Neither the 2010 amendment nor the Court's decision in 
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As a result, Buckskin was required to file a petition for judicial review within 28 days of 
the final decision ofthe County. Idaho Code §§ 67-6519(4), 67-6521 (1)(d). Instead of 
appealing, Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement on the same day the CUP was 
issued. 
B. Judicial review is the exclusive means to challenge a decision under 
LLUPA. 
This Court has held repeatedly that judicial review under LLUP A is the exclusive 
procedure for challenging a decision to grant or deny a permit where review is provided under 
LLUP A. In Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), the plaintiff brought 
a petition for declaratory judgment and an application for a writ of mandate instead of filing an 
appeal from the denial of rezoning application. The Court admonished the plaintiff for trying to 
"bypass" the statute declaring that LLUP A "is the exclusive source of appeal for adverse zoning 
actions." Bone, 107 Idaho at 848, 693 P.2d at 1050. The Court explained: 
We find § 67-5215(b-g) [the former judicial review 
provisions of lAP A incorporated by LLUP A] to be a complete, 
detailed, and exhaustive remedy upon which an aggrieved party 
can appeal an adverse zoning decision. We also find that the 
legislature's intent in outlining the scope of review and the bases 
upon which a court may reverse a governing body's zoning 
decision to be clear. 
Bone, 107 Idaho at 847-48,693 P.2d 1049-50. 
The Court reached the same result in Curtis v. City o/Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 
210 (1986). There, a subdivision applicant missed the deadline for filing a LLUP A appeal and 
instead brought an inverse condemnation action against the City. The Court rejected the 
collateral action, noting that Curtis' constitutional arguments could have and should have been 
Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633,181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008) changed the availability of 
judicial review for CUPs and fmal plats. Both were reviewable before and remain reviewable today under LLUP A. 
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raised in a timely judicial review under LLUPA. Curtis, 111 Idaho at 32-33, 720 P.2d at 215-
216 (the reference to the former 60-day deadline corresponds to today's 28-day deadline). 
Similarly, this Court held in Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 
615, 619 (2004), that the Regans "had improperly bypassed the exclusive source of appeal" by 
suing the county for declaratory judgment concerning the interpretation of the county's land use 
ordinance. This Court went on to hold that "[t]he Regans' failure to exhaust their administrative 
remedies deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over their claim for declaratory 
relief." Regan, 140 Idaho at 726, 100 P.3d at 620. 
The exclusivity of judicial review also arises in areas of the law besides land use 
decisions under LLUPA. In Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133-34, 139 P.3d 732, 
735-36 (2006), this Court held that a petition for judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 40-208 (the public road statute) is the exclusive means to challenge a county's decision 
concerning the validation of a road. Citing Bone, this Court reiterated that, when provided, 
statutory judicial review proceedings are exclusive remedies. 
We are not aware of an Idaho case applying this principle in the context of impact fees, 
but courts in other jurisdictions have done so. In Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, 868 A.2d 172 
(Maine 2005), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered a declaratory judgment action 
brought by developers who had paid impact fees under an allegedly unconstitutional and illegal 
ordinance. The Court held that the action was barred by the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the 
city's approval oftheir subdivisions, which included the payment of the impact fees as a 
condition, within 30 days as provided under state law. "When the time to file an appeal expired, 
the conditional approvals, including the impact fee requirements, became final, and were not 
subject to challenge." Sold Inc. at 176 (citation omitted). 
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Similarly, in James v. County of Kitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005), the Washington 
Supreme Court addressed claims from developers who sought refunds of impact fees paid during 
the time that the county's ordinances were not in compliance with state law. In James, the 
county appealed from a summary judgment that awarded the developers more than three million 
dollars in refunds arguing, inter alia, that the developers' claims were barred by their failure to 
challenge the fees within 21 days of when the permits were issued, as required under 
Washington's Land Use Petition Act ("LUPA"). The James Court agreed with the county. 
"[W]e find that the imposition of impact fees as a condition on the issuance of a building pennit 
is a land use decision and is not reviewable unless a party timely challenges that decision within 
21 days of its issuance." James at 292. The Court rejected the developers' argument that the 
superior court had original jurisdiction to hear their claims: 
The Developers here were provided, by statute, with 
several avenues to challenge the legality of the impact fees 
imposed by the County and comply with the procedural 
requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A. ... However, 
rather than complying with either of these procedures provided by 
statute, the Developers waited almost three years before 
challenging the legality of the impact fees imposed by the County. 
The Developers have not complied with the procedures provided 
under LUP A and RCW 82.02.070(4) and are barred under LUPA 
from challenging the legality of the fees imposed. 
James at 293-94. The James court went on to describe the public policy considerations that 
supported limiting challenges to land use decisions to the procedures available under the statute. 
As we stated in [Chelan County v.] Nykreim, this court has 
long recognized the strong public policy evidenced in LUP A, 
supporting administrative finality in land use decisions. 146 
Wash.2d at 931-32,52 P.3d 1. The purpose and policy of the law 
in establishing definite time limits is to allow property owners to 
proceed with assurance in developing their property. Additionally, 
and particularly with respect to impact fees, the purpose and policy 
of chapter 82.02 RCW in correlation with the procedural 
requirements of LUP A ensure that local jurisdictions have timely 
notice of potential impact fee challenges. Without notice of these 
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challenges, local jurisdictions would be less able to plan and fund 
construction of necessary public facilities. Absent enforcement of 
the requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A, local 
jurisdictions would alternatively be faced with delaying necessary 
capacity improvements until the three-year statute oflimitations 
for challenging impact fees had run. 
James at 294. Buckskin's lawsuit is the perfect illustration of why this policy is needed. 
Based upon these authorities from Idaho and elsewhere, the rule is indisputable-if a 
procedure for judicial review of a decision has been created by the legislature, then that 
procedure is the exclusive means to challenge that decision (absent exceptions not applicable 
here), and a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a collateral attack. Because 
judicial review under LLUPA was Buckskin's exclusive means of challenging the County's 
decisions, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Buckskin's civil action. 
C. Buckskin may not avoid LLUPA judicial review by contending that it 
is not challenging the approvals themselves, or that this lawsuit is a 
challenge to LUDO. 
Buckskin may argue that its collateral attack is permissible because it is not challenging 
the approvals themselves. Yet a simple review of the Complaint and undisputed facts shows that 
the claims arise from, and are a direct challenge to, the decisions made by the County with 
regard to the approval of Buckskin's applications for development. 15 The Court cut through a 
similar diversionary fog in Curtis, 111 Idaho at 32-33, 720 P.2d at 215-16: "The heart of 
appellant's case is that the city's application of its zoning ordinances to appellant's property has 
15 Buckskin specifically refers to the condition of approval imposed by the County that required a written 
agreement to mitigate traffic impacts. Complaint, ~ 10, R. Vol. I, p. 3. Buckskin alleges ill the Complaint that the 
County "illegally required Buckskin to enter illto a Capital Contribution Agreement and Road Development 
Agreement solely for the purpose of collectillg an impact fee." Complaint, ~ 22, R. Vol. I, p. 5. Further, ill the 
prayer for relief, Buckskin asks the Court to declare that "Valley County's use of the Capital Contribution 
Agreement and Road Development Agreement as a condition of approval to collect monies from Plailltiffs for their 
proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised 
impact fee and is therefore illegal." Complaint, R. Vol. I, p. 6. The staff reports, meetillg minutes, and the CUP 
itself all reflect that a condition of approval is that the Development Agreements receive approval from the Board of 
County Commissioners. Herrick Aff., Exhs. 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
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resulted in a taking of his property by inverse condemnation .... Appellant's arguments are 
nothing more than a challenge of the city council's quasi-judicial action denying his subdivision 
application. As such, the express provisions ofl.C. §§ 67-6519, -6521(d), limit appellant's 
remedy to seeking judicial review of the city council's action pursuant to I.C. § 67-5215(b)-(g)." 
Nor can Buckskin credibly contend that its lawsuit is really a constitutional challenge to 
the Land Use Development Ordinance ("LUDO"). First, such a claim is not found in the 
Complaint. Second, LUDO itself does not mandate (or even address) the fees contemplated 
under the CIP and the Development Agreements. Buckskin points to a sentence in the ordinance 
containing the words "impact fees." But the ordinance is talking about something entirely 
different. LUDO states: "The Commission may recommend to the Board impact fees as 
authorized by Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal." Appellants' Brief at 4 
(referencing R. Vol. II, p. 298). Idaho Code § 31-870 authorizes the imposition "fees for 
services" in which the "fees collected pursuant to this section shall be reasonably related to, but 
shall not exceed, the actual cost of the service being rendered." This describes the ordinary, 
garden-variety service fees that, as the Court held in Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 
502,505, 768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988), fall within the police power and are not illegal taxes. Thus, 
the County's actions challenged by Buckskin were "as applied" actions, not ones mandated by 
LUDO's reference to "impact fees." In short, LUDO has nothing to do with this lawsuit. 
D. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply here. 
Buckskin may also seek to hide behind the two exceptions to the requirement of 
administrative exhaustion: "( a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when the agency 
acted outside its authority," KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 
(2003). Neither applies here. 
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By the way, the law of exhaustion requires litigants to utilize available administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial relief. This is codified in the lAP A at Idaho Code § 67-5271. 
What we are talking about here is Buckskin's obligation to utilize judicial remedies under 
LLUP A. However, the law of administrative exhaustion is sometimes applied in the context of 
failure to pursue available judicial review. E.g., Regan. Accordingly, to be on the safe side, we 
address the exceptions here. 
(1) Exhaustion exception 1: Plaintiffs cannot meet the "interests 
of justice" exception. 
The "interests of justice" exception requires Buckskin to demonstrate that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if exhaustion is required. Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576, 581, 149 P.3d 851, 
856 (2006). Buckskin fails this test. Buckskin could have raised these same issues in a timely 
petition for judicial review of the County's actions. Instead, Buckskin waited for years, only 
objecting after the money was spent for its benefit and it is too late to reverse course. No public 
policy is served by encouraging such delinquent behavior. Likewise, Buckskin's claims as to 
future phases of The Meadows are mooted by Resolution 11-6. Simply put, there is no showing 
of any potential irreparable harm and therefore no reason to excuse Buckskin from the 
requirement to seek judicial review. 
(2) Exhaustion exception 2: The "outside the agency's authority" 
exception does not apply. 
A review of the cases shows that this exception typically applies only to facial challenges 
to ordinances and statutesl6-which this action is not. Even if the "outside the agency's 
16 "Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to address appellant's constitutional claims. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies!§ generally required before constitutional claims are mised." Service 
Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 762, 683 P.2d 404, 410 (1984) 
(emphasis supplied). Although the opinion does not say what constitutional claims were mised, the dissent shows 
that they involved fact-based, "as applied" equal protection claims, not facial challenges. Likewise, the Court noted 
in Palmer v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of Blaine County, 117 Idaho 562, 564, 790 P.2d 343,345 (1990): "This Court 
has frequently announced that except in unusual circumstances parties must exhaust their administrative remedies 
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authority" exception does apply to "as applied" challenges like this one, however, it does not 
matter because the County acted within its planning and zoning authority. This is illustrated by 
the decision in American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 872, 154 P.3d 
433,443 (2007).17 Thus, if an agency acts entirely outside its regulatory authority (for instance, 
if a county sought to rule on the validity of an applicant's water rights) then the action could be 
challenged without exhaustion. But where the governmental entity has regulatory authority over 
the subject matter and the only question is whether it has exercised that authority lawfully, then 
exhaustion is required. 
The Sold, Inc. court considered this same issue. Maine law recognizes the same 
exception to the exhaustion requirement for government actions that are "beyond the jurisdiction 
or authority ofthe administrative body to act." Sold, Inc., 868 A.2d at 176. In that case, the 
court found that the imposition of impact fees as conditions of approval was within the 
jurisdiction and authority of the city, even in the face of statutory and constitutional challenges. 
before seeking judicial recourse." No exception applied because "[h Jere, there is no challenge to the validity of 
Ordinance 77-5." This, too, suggests that the exception applies only to facial challenges. Another example is found 
in White v. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003). In White, the Court rejected an end run 
around LLUP A's judicial review requirements by a neighbor challenging approval of an asphalt plant. Rather than 
appeal, White filed suit raising various "as applied" due process challenges. The county sought dismissal for failure 
to exhaust. The Court stated: "We also conclude that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not 
apply to the present case where the question of a conditional use permit 'is one within the zoning authority'S 
specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief. ", 
White, 139 Idaho at 402, 80 P.3d at 338 (citing Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 124, 
804 P.2d 294,297 (1990». The obvious conclusion is that when parties to a land use matter wish to challenge an 
"as applied" decision of a governing board (as opposed to the ordinance itself) they must first utilize the 
administrative procedures including judicial review. 
17 In American Falls, the Court explained that trying to figure out whether an agency acted outside its 
authority is essentially a circular argument (except in those rare cases where the agency had no authority over the 
subject matter at all). Thus, a plaintiff may not avoid the exhaustion requirement merely by alleging that the 
agency's action is unlawful and therefore beyond the scope of its authority. That would be circuitous, and 
exhaustion would never be required when challenging agency action. Rather, for the exception to apply, the agency 
must have acted on a matter entirely outside of its bailiwick. In such cases, no circuitous analysis is required to 
determine it acted outside the scope of its authority. The American Falls Court concluded: "Thus, the exception for 
when an agency exceeds its authority does not apply unless the CM Rules are facially unconstitutionaL" American 
Falls, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. 
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Here, there is no dispute that the Planning Board had 
authority to consider, approve, and attach conditions to approvals 
of subdivisions. Plaintiffs only challenge one condition of the 
subdivision approval as inconsistent with statutory and 
constitutional requirements. Such challenges are the essence of 
matters that must be brought pursuant to Rule 80B to question 
whether the particular action of a municipal administrative agency 
is consistent with the requirements oflaw. 
1d. Here, the County had authority to issue CUPs and to impose conditions, so exhaustion is 
required and Buckskin's collateral attack is barred. 
III. BUCKSKIN'S STATE CLAIMS ARE UNTIMELY UNDER IDAHO'S FOUR-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION. 
Even if this Court were to determine that Buckskin was not bound to seek judicial review 
within 28 days and could instead bring a collateral challenge to the County's action, such a claim 
would be subject to the statute oflimitations. Lawsuits alleging inverse condemnation or other 
fonus of relief involving an alleged taking are subject to Idaho's residual four-year statute of 
limitations. Idaho Code § 5-224; Harris v. State, ex reI. Kempthorne, 148 Idaho 401, 404, 210 
P.3d 86, 89 (2009). The only question is when the clock starts to run. Ifthe cause of action 
accrued before December 1, 2005, the state claims are barred. 
A. Buckskin's cause of action accrued and the statute began to run when 
it became apparent that Buckskin would be required to contribute 
toward road improvements. 
Buckskin contends the statute did not begin to run until it wrote a check on December 15, 
2005, thus beating the statute by a few days. But the statute was triggered well before that. 
This Court has consistently explained that a claim for a regulatory taking accrues and the 
statute of limitation runs from "the time that the full extent of the plaintiff s loss of use and 
enjoyment of the property becomes apparent," that is, when the plaintiff "was fully aware of the 
extent to which Canyon County interfered with his full use and enjoyment ofthe property." 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'rs (HMcCuskey 11"), 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 
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(1996) (quoting Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho 878,880, 728 P.2d 767, 769 
(1986) and citing Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)18) 
(emphasis supplied). 
In Harris, 147 Idaho at 405, 210 P.3d at 90, this Court ruled that the statute oflimitations 
on inverse condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral 
lease with the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease. "We affirm the 
district court's determination that the full extent ofthe Harrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the 
property became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the 
impairment constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed 
an agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the 
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224." 
Harris, 147 Idaho 405, 210 P.3d 90 (emphasis supplied). 
Similarly, this Court has said that the statute begins to run "when the impairment was of 
such a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's property interest became 
apparent." Wadsworth v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d 1, 
5 (1996) (emphasis supplied). 
The County's alleged substantial interference with Buckskin's property interests was 
apparent at each of the following events: 
18 The Tibbs case is often referenced in cases dealing with the statute of limitations and the date of accrual. 
The Tibbs Court stated: "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detennination, is to be 
fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial 
interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671,603 P.2d at 1005. 
Curiously, however, the Tibbs case did not involve the statute oflimitations. The case was an action for inverse 
condenmation involving an expansion of an airport, where the impact on the neighboring property was gradual. The 
question in the case was how and when to value the decline in property value. The reference to accrual arose in the 
context of fixing the dates for detennination of "the difference in the value of the property before and after the 
destruction or impairment of the access." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670, 603 P.2d at 1004. 
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• On April 1, 2004, Buckskin filed its application for a CUP, which included as 
Appendix C a proposed Development Agreement - The Meadows at West 
Mountain ("Proposed Development Agreement") and a Proposed Capital 
Contribution Agreement. The paragraph on "Road Improvements" in the Capital 
Contribution Agreement says, "Developer agrees to pay a road impact fee as 
established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley 
County Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Appendix D to the Application is an "Impact Report." It 
states: "Currently this fee has been set by the County Engineer at $1,870.00 per 
equivalent single-family residential unit. Road impact fees may be offset by 
developer contribution of right-of-way or in-kind construction." (Emphasis 
supplied.) Herrick AjJ., Exh. 3. 
• On May 17, 2004, the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") 
recommended approval of the CUP. The minutes ofthat meeting recited that Joe 
Pachner, speaking for applicant, said: "The traffic report completed by the 
Tamarack Resort has been incorporated into the design of this project. The 
impact ofthis project using this roadway is incorporated and they will pay their 
proportional impact fees." Likewise, Pat Dobie, the County Engineer said: "[A] 
fee of approximately $1,800 per residential unit will be required to construct the 
roads." Herrick AjJ., Exh. 6. 
• On May 21, 2004, Buckskin submitted a revised application for CUP. It 
contained the same proposed agreements as were included in the initial 
application on April 1, 2004. Herrick AjJ., Exh. 4. 
• On June 10,2004, the P&Z issued Findings and Conclusions recommending 
approval of the revised CUP application. The recommendation included this 
condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution 
Agreement must receive approval from the Board of County Commissioners." 
Herrick Aff., Exh. 7. 
• On July 12, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners voted to approve the 
revised CUP. The minutes contain a discussion of Capital Contribution 
Agreement and acceptance of the conveyance of right-of-way in lieu of cash. 
Herrick Aff., Exh. 10. 
• On July 14, 2004, Buckskin's CUP was issued by the P&Z (following approval 
by the County). Herrick Aff., Exh. 11. 
• On the same day, Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement setting out 
the payment requirements (a right-of-way conveyance with a credit for future 
phases). Paragraph 2 provided: "Currently this amount has been calculated by 
the Valley County Engineer to be $461.00 per average daily vehicle trip generated 
by the Project." As shown on Exhibit B, this equates to $1,844 per lot. Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 1. Based on this, the District Court concluded that "the Plaintiffs 
certainly knew the essential facts" by this date. R. Vol. III, p. 490. 
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• On September 9,2004, the P&Z approved the final plat for Phase 1. The minutes 
state at page 3: "They also discussed the maintenance of private roads, the 
dedication of public right of way, and that $1,844 per lot will be paid toward road 
maintenance." Herrick Aff., Exh. 14. 
• On October 25, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners approved the final plat 
for Phase 1. The County expressly accepted Buckskin's conveyance of the right-
of-way as provided in the Capital Contribution Agreement. 19 Herrick Aff., Exh. 
15. This is the date on which the District Court said the statute oflimitations ran 
'[a]t the very latest." R. Vol. III, p. 490. 
• On September 26, 2005, the parties executed the Road Development Agreement 
for Phases 2 and 3. One of the recitals states: "Developer has agreed to 
participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate 
fair share of the cost of the needed improvements identified in the Agreement and 
listed on the attached Exhibit A." The fee set at $247,096, less the credit from 
Phase 1, requiring a cash payment of$232,160. This was based on $1,844 per 
single family lot and $1,383 per apartment unit. HerrickAff., Exh. 2. 
Buckskin's knowledge that it would be required to contribute toward road improvements 
is evident in the very application it filed on April 1, 2004, which included a proposal to make 
such payments. Indeed, Buckskin has admitted that it included the proposed agreements with its 
application because it understood such mitigation was required. Pachner Aff., ~~ 4-8 (R. Vol. II, 
pp. 281-84.). The admission is repeated in Buckskin's Appellants' Brief "The CIP requires that 
developers pay a fee .... In this case, Buckskin was required to pay an impact fee for each 
phase as each phase came up for final plat." Appellants' Briefat 6, 13. 
If that were not enough, the substantial interference was apparent when the CUP was 
issued on July 14, 2004, the same day that Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement. 
Finally, as Judge McLaughlin noted, the substantial interference was apparent, at the very latest, 
on October 25, 2004, the day the right-of-way was conveyed to the County. (This conveyance 
was made for Phase 1, but carried over for Phases 2 and 3 via a credit.) 
19 The minutes of the approval at page 2 recite as follows: "accept the dedication of public right-of-way 
along Norwood Road and West Roseberry Road; ... agree that the Development Agreement that is [in] place 
covers off-site road improvement costs for this phase; .... " Herrick 4ff., Exh. 15. 
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In this case, the amount of the payment per unit set in the Development Agreements 
signed by the parties was the same as called for in Buckskin's original application on April 1, 
2004. But even if that were not the case, it would make no difference. The statute runs even 
though plaintiff does not know "the full extent of his damages." McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 217, 
912 P.2d at 104. Indeed, in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333,1338 (1982), the 
Court said the statute ran on the date of a meeting between the parties at which time there was 
"recognition ofthe severity of the problem." R. Vol. III, p. 490. 
The fact that payment for Phases 2 and 3 occurred after December 1, 2005 (less than four 
years before the Complaint was filed) does not change that fact that the impairment of 
Buckskin's property was apparent long before that. Buckskin's insistence that the statute does 
not begin to run until payment is made cannot be reconciled, for example, with Harris, 147 
Idaho at 405,210 P.3d at 90, in which this Court ruled that the statute oflimitations on inverse 
condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with 
the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease. 
Given this clear and unwavering line of authority, it is perplexing why Buckskin would 
make a statement like this: "Merely being aware that a taking of one's property is imminent 
does not rise to the level of 'substantial interference' nor is it sufficient to start the clock on the 
statute of limitations." Appellants' Brief at 15. The opposite is true. 
B. Buckskin's cause of action arose simultaneously as to all claims and 
all phases of the project. 
Buckskin insists that "each payment should have been considered a separate taking with 
separate accrual dates." Appellants' Briefat 12. It says the District Court's rejection ofthis 
assertion "is in error because it flies in the face of the doctrine of ripeness." Appellants' Brief at 
14. Here is the problem that Buckskin perceives: "When the impact fees were paid on Phase 1 
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no other payments were made and therefore no other takings had occurred. Had Buckskin sued 
for 'just compensation' for all future fees it had yet to pay, that lawsuit would have been 
dismissed because the claims would not have been ripe." Appellants' Brie/at 14. 
This argument goes nowhere. First, Buckskin is not suing, even now, for reimbursement 
(i.e., inverse condemnation) as to future fees it has yet to pay. That would be absurd. Instead, it 
is suing, quite sensibly, for reimbursement as to past fees and a declaration that it is not required 
to pay additional fees in the future. 
This is how it always works in exaction cases. Exaction cases are different than physical 
takings. In a physical taking, the plaintiff cannot stop the taking from occurring. Governments 
have the right to take property for public purposes. Accordingly, the plaintiff must wait until the 
property is taken and then seek just compensation. But when the exaction is illegal (e.g., where a 
condition of approval is that the plaintiff is required to pay an allegedly illegal tax), the plaintiff 
can sue at once to stop the exaction before it happens. (This is one reason the accrual date for 
physical takings is different.) 
In Buckskin's case, payments have been made on three phases, but not for the remaining 
phases. Buckskin is free to plead its request for backward-looking relief and forward-looking 
relief as separate "claims" if it likes. But that does not change the fact that these "claims" are 
joined at the hip. Both "claims" arise out of the same CUP and the same alleged constitutional 
vice-the imposition of illegal taxes. Accordingly, they became ripe (and therefore accrued) at 
the same time. 
Apparently Buckskin believes that its request for declaratory relief as to future fees was 
ripe in 2009 when it filed this lawsuit. But if it was ripe in 2009, then it must have been ripe all 
along. Nothing changed since 2004 to make it more ripe in 2009. (If anything, it is less ripe due 
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to Resolution 11-6.) The fact is, this suit was ripe when Buckskin submitted its application 
and/or received the CUP and executed the Development Agreements. It should have been filed 
within four years of that (if not within 28 days of CUP issuance). 
There are, by the way, occasions when a facial taking challenge can be mounted even 
before an application for development is filed. Such was the case with Mountain Central Bd. of 
Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 
2008) (reproduced in Appendix B). This case was filed by a group of affected realtors and 
developers before any ofthem had any particular project in play. They had to show that they had 
standing, of course, and that was an issue. But once standing is established, lawsuits such as 
Mountain Central based on a facial challenge to an unconstitutional ordinance are certainly ripe. 
This reference to Mountain Central should not be misunderstood as a suggestion that suit 
necessarily must be filed the moment an illegal ordinance is enacted. This is the "absurd result" 
that Buckskin warns of in Appellants' Brief at 36. But it will not occur. In order to establish 
standing and to meet other threshold requirements, a plaintiff must establish that the ordinance 
affects its property or legal interests in some concrete way resulting in particularized injury. 
Martin v. Camas County ex reI. Bd. ofComm'rs., 150 Idaho 508, 512-13, 248 P.3d 1243, 1247-
48 (2011). In Buckskin's case, there was no facially unconstitutional ordinance, and Buckskin's 
injury occurred on April 1, 2004, July 14, 2004, or "at the latest" October 25, 2004.20 
20 The Mountain Central case is different from the case at bar because it was a facial challenge. Despite 
what Buckskin says, this case is an as applied challenge. The County may have had a practice of conditioning 
approvals to require road fees, but that practice was not driven by or even authorized by ordinance. The CIP was not 
adopted by ordinance, and LUDO's reference to "impact fees" was limited to lawful, statutorily authorized user fees. 
(See discussion in section V.B at page 35). While the Mountain Central case arose in a different context, we 
mention it here simply to show the plain error in Buckskin's assertion that a case challenging impact fees cannot be 
ripe until payment is made on each phase. 
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C. The Court should not depart from precedent and apply a different 
accrual standard. 
Buckskin argues that the Court should depart from precedent because public policy 
considerations favor a finding of separate accrual dates for each phase. Buckskin makes much of 
the fact that the County updated its cost calculation for road improvements subsequent to the first 
two Development Agreements. This is of no legal consequence, because it does not alter the fact 
that it was apparent from the outset that Buckskin would have to pay something. Moreover, the 
change in payment is moot, because of Resolution 11-6. Nor is there any basis for Buckskin's 
contention that the County could raise the fees based on its "whim" (Opening Brief at 21). The 
CUP and the agreements between the County and Buckskin are all premised on the CIP, which is 
a highly technical, structured, and constrained approach to fee calculation upon which CUP 
holders are entitled to rely. Buckskin could challenge any future final plat in the event the 
County tried to impose a requirement inconsistent with the CIP framework (or with Resolution 
11-6). In any event, the change in fees was no surprise to Buckskin. As noted in the bullet 
points above in section IILA, Buckskin's own proposed agreement and the Development 
Agreements it ultimately signed each contained a statement as to how the fee is "currently" set-
thus reflecting recognition that it could change. Everyone understood that the CIP was intended 
as an ongoing, iterative process in which the status of infrastructure needs would be periodically 
reviewed and the formula recalibrated reflecting the latest data. 
As for public policy, the Legislature has expressed its view of public policy by enacting 
the statutes of limitation (as well as time limits on judicial review). The public policy reflected 
in that legislation, and in the Court's interpretation ofthose statutes, is a sensible one. This is 
particularly so here where the local government has made substantial investments of resources. 
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If reimbursements are ordered years after the fact, plaintiffs may receive something for nothing 
while shifting the cost of their development to the taxpayer. 
Next Buckskin urges the Court to scrap decades of settled law and adopt the "project 
completion rule" from physical takings cases. Buckskin has switched course on appeal. Before 
the District Court, Buckskin took the remarkable position that this is a physical taking case. 
Plaintiffs 'Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 34. R. 
Vol. I, p. 110. It has wisely abandoned that position on appeal, but nonetheless urges the Court 
to change the law so that it may take advantage of the rules applicable to physical takings. 
In C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143-44, 75 P.3d 194, 197-
98 (2003), this Court explained the simple policy reason for adopting the project completion 
rule: "[T]he property owner was justified in waiting until the project was completed before 
bringing suit for damages because until completion, there was no reliable method to determine 
the extent of the damages." Obviously, that policy rule has no applicability here. Plaintiffs 
certainly knew what their alleged "damages" were when they signed the Development 
Agreements. Moreover, given that courts have the power to enjoin an unlawful exaction before 
payment is made, there is no sense in waiting. 
D. Cases from other jurisdictions concerning payment of fees or taxes 
are inapposite. 
In support of its argument that its claims for refunds of the fees paid under the 
Development Agreements did not accrue until such time as Buckskin actually tendered the funds 
to the County, Buckskin discusses several cases from other jurisdictions in which the courts 
ruled that the plaintiffs' claims accrued on the date that payment was made. These cases are 
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unremarkable and inapplicable here.21 The County recognizes that many claims arising from the 
payment of allegedly unlawful taxes and fees accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, on the 
date that the money is paid to the government. Buckskin stubbornly refuses to grasp that the 
distinction between its claim and those cases is the date upon which the impairment became 
apparent. 
IV. BUCKSKIN'S ACTION WAS VOLUNTARY WITHIN THE MEANING OF KMST. 
The KMSTcase applied Williamson County in ruling that ACHD's action could not be 
challenged under § 1983 because its decision was not a "final decision." This Court then went 
on to say that even if ACHD's recommendation had been a final decision, it would not have 
constituted a taking because the dedication was voluntary. In a pre-application meeting, ACHD 
staff advised KMST that staff would recommend a requirement of a road dedication. In order to 
move things along, KMST agreed to the dedication and included it in its application. This 
proved fatal to KMST's taking claim. 
KMST representatives included the construction and dedication of 
Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that 
failing to do so would delay closing on the property and 
development ofthe property. KMST's property was not taken. It 
21 In both Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County ofDuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001) and Venture Coal Sales 
Company v. u.s., 370 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the courts rejected plaintiffs' argument that the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until there was a court decision declaring the fee or tax to be illegal. That is 
consistent with the holding in BHA II. In all three cases, the payments were actually made well beyond the 
applicable statute oflimitations and there was simply no need to analyze whether the claim accrued any earlier. 
Furthermore, all three of those cases, as well as Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005), Paul v. 
City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.I. 2000), and Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass 'n v. City of La Habra, 23 P.3d 
601 (Cal. 2001), involved fees or taxes imposed via ordinance instead of a condition of approval of a land use 
permit. As a result, in those cases there was no administrative process, no application of the ordinance, and no other 
government action until such time as the fee or tax was actually paid. In the instant case, the impairment upon 
Buckskin's property interest became apparent when the requirement to enter into the Development Agreements 
(which Buckskin knew included contributions for road improvements) was imposed by the County. 
The Howard Jarvis court distinguished a case nearly identical to this appeal, Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City 
of San Ramon, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26 (Ct. App. 2001), which involved a challenge to a traffic mitigation fee imposed in 
connection with the approval of a subdivision. In Ponderosa, the claim accrued (both for purposes of the state 
statute oflimitations and § 1983) when the fee was imposed rather than when it was paid, which was when the 
development was conditionally approved by the city. The same result obtains here-Buckskin's claim accrued 
when the impairment became apparent, which occurred more than four years prior to the filing of its action. 
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voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to 
speed approval of its development. Having done so, it cannot now 
claim that its property was "taken." 
KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotations identifying 
district court's language omitted). This language is significant because it shows that a 
developer's action may be "voluntary" even when motivated by a desire to speed the processing 
of its application. In other words, the Court was not talking about altruism. Rather, it spoke of 
voluntary action in the sense of a calculated decision by the applicant to take the simplest path 
forward even when that means paying money. 
Buckskin's situation is indistinguishable from KMST's. Perhaps the developers of The 
Meadows were not pleased with the idea of paying for road improvements benefiting their 
property, but they did not say so and they certainly did not challenge the County's authority to 
require such mitigation. One way or another, the County was responsible for ensuring that 
adequate infrastructure would be in place to support the new development. Buckskin could have 
simply waited until the County was able to raise the funds to build that infrastructure. Instead, in 
order to speed the project forward, Buckskin elected to make contributions to the County 
reflecting the project's proportionate share of the costs of the improvements. Having so elected, 
Buckskin cannot now be heard to complain that the payments they agreed to make were illegal 
taxes. This was the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in KMST. 
Buckskin attempts to distinguish its actions from those of the developers in KMST by 
claiming that they believed that the County's ordinance (LUDO) mandated the Development 
Agreements, and that County officials told them that road impact mitigation would be required. 
R.Vol. I, p. 104. But that is no different from the situation in KMST. In that case, the developer 
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agreed to the road dedication because he was told by ACHD staff that it would be recommended 
as a requirement. KMST, 138 Idaho at 579,67 P.3d at 58?2 
Buckskin's actions were plainly voluntary in this sense. Buckskin included an express 
offer of mitigation contributions in its application and then agreed to slightly modified terms in 
the Development Agreements. The terms of the Development Agreements are unambiguous. 
They are plainly entitled "AGREEMENTS" and provide that the developer "agrees" to 
participate in the cost of improving the roads near the proposed development.23 Regardless of 
what discussions mayor may not have taken place with County staff 24 and regardless of 
Buckskin's understandings and assumptions, ifit were not true that the developer was voluntarily 
agreeing to help pay for the improvement of the roads, then Buckskin should not have signed 
documents saying that it agreed?5 
22 Buckskin also claims that in 2004 it was "mislead [sic] into believing that Valley County could collect an 
impact fee" by the LUDO Appellants' Brief at 20. Buckskin then quotes a statement from a Valley County 
Commissioner in 2009 expressing concern over the legality of the road development agreements. These arguments 
are specious. The LUDO plainly does not mandate contributions toward road improvements, and any debate 
regarding the legality of the County's actions in 2009 only demonstrates the County's good faith efforts to address 
this issue. 
23 The Capital Contribution Agreement signed by Buckskin on July 14, 2004 contains this recital on page 
1: "Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate fair 
share of the cost of the needed improvements .... " Herrick AjJ, Exh. 1. The Proposed Development Agreement 
states at ~ 2.18 at page 4: "Development of the Property pursuant to this Development Agreement will also result in 
significant benefits to Developer .... ", at ~ 2.19 at page 4: "Developer and the County have cooperated in the 
preparation of this Development Agreement .... ", and at ~ 2.20 at page 4: "The parties desire to enter into this 
Development Agreement .... " Herrick AjJ, Exh. 3, Appendix C to the Application. 
24 To the extent that Buckskin contends that entering into the Development Agreements was involuntary 
because of alleged statements by County staff, this argument is without merit. Idaho case law and the County's 
LUDO are clear that only the Board of County Commissioners has authority to make a final decision on such 
matters. These facts are identical to the situation in KMST. 
25 The recognition in KMST that voluntary actions do not give rise to takings is not undercut by the Court's 
holding in BHA II, which held that plaintiffs are not required to pay under protest as a prerequisite to challenging an 
unlawful tax. The BHA II case involved a transfer fee charged by the City of Boise on liquor licenses. The Court 
ruled in a prior case, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA 1"), 138 Idaho 356, 357-58, 63 P.3d 482,483-84 
(2004), that the City had no regulatory authority whatsoever with respect to the transfer ofliquor licenses. Only the 
State has such authority. Id. BHA II involved two consolidated cases-the original BHA I case following remand 
and a different case. In BHA II, the district court dismissed a claim by a different set of plaintiffs because they had 
not paid the fee under protest. This was based on an old line of cases (e.g., Walker v. Wedgwood, 64 Idaho 285, 130 
P.2d 856 (1942» holding that plaintiffs must pay taxes under protest to preserve the right to request a refund. The 
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V. BUCKSKIN'S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
A. The claim for declaratory action is no different from the claim for 
inverse condemnation and accrued at the same time 
Buckskin believes that even if its inverse condemnation claim is barred as untimely, its 
request for declaratory judgment on the same subject somehow survives. Buckskin says: "The 
district court's ruling either ignores Count I of Buckskin's Complaint or it subsumes Buckskin's 
illegal fee or tax claim within its inverse condemnation claim, and assigns to the illegal fee or tax 
claim the same standard for accrual as for inverse condemnation." Appellants' Briefat 29. That 
is exactly what the District Court did, and exactly what it should have done. Buckskin's 
assertion that its request for declaratory relief is "wholly separate," Appellants' Brief at 29, from 
its inverse condemnation claim is simply wrong. They are one and the same. Its assertion that it 
"pleaded a claim for illegal fee or tax as an alternative to its inverse condemnation claim," 
Appellants' Briefat 30, makes no sense. If there has been a taking, the one and only reason is 
that the contribution toward road improvements was an illegal tax. The "taking" and the "tax" 
claims are one and the same. (See footnote 2 at page 7.) 
An inverse "condemnation action" is nothing more than a handy description for this type 
oftakings claim. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained: 
The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one that was 
coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a 
landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property 
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. ... The 
Supreme Court reversed the district court on that point, ruling that the requirement that taxes be paid under protest 
applies to lawful taxes, and is inapplicable in cases involving unlawful taxes. BHA II, 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 
323. In essence, the City of Boise tried to pull a fast one by saying, in essence, "OK, if our liquor license transfer 
fee is really a tax as you claim, you should have paid it under protest." The Court did not buy it. The inapplicability 
of BHA II is reflected in the fact that, in KMST, the Court noted one of the reasons that it was clear that plaintiff's 
action was voluntary was because they did not pay the impact fees under protest. "[Plaintiff] did not request an 
individual assessment of the amount of its impact fees; it did not appeal the calculation of the fees; and it did not pay 
the fees assessed under protest. It simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially calculated." KMST, 138 Idaho 
at 583, 67 P.3d at 62 (emphasis supplied). 
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phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of 
that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the 
"inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding. 
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-57 (1980). Asking for declaratory relief in addition 
to seeking recovery of money paid is simply a belt and suspenders form of pleading. They are 
not separate causes of action. Ifno property has yet been taken, then the relief would corne 
solely in the form of a declaratory judgment or perhaps an injunction. Whether you call this 
"inverse condemnation" or a "duck" or a "goose" makes no difference. They all arise out ofthe 
same facts and legal principles-the assertion the property has been taken or is about to be taken. 
This Court has noted on more than one occasion that "[a]n inverse condemnation action 
cannot be maintained unless an actual taking of private property is established." Covington v. 
Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002). That may be, but in the case of 
an allegedly unlawful exaction, the cause of action arises as soon as it becomes apparent that the 
exaction will be imposed. Unlike physical takings, there is no need to wait for the money to be 
paid and then seek a recovery. This is not a situation where the government has the authority to 
take a person's property, and it is simply a question of paying for it. Here, Buckskin's allegation 
is that the government had no authority at all to demand payments for road improvements. If 
that is the case, it was a per se taking from the moment the County made clear that such payment 
would be required as a condition of development. Indeed, this is why the district court declared 
the City of McCall's impact fee ordinance invalid in Mountain Central. 
Buckskin cites the case of Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, 111 Idaho 878, 728 
P.2d 767 (1986) (whose facts are more fully explained in the prior case of Boise City v. Blaser, 
98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977)), noting that the Court evaluated two different accrual dates 
for two claims. That is because there were two distinct claims. One was a tort claim based on 
the City's failure to recognize that the developer was entitled to rely on a prior zoning certificate 
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obtained from Ada County before the land was annexed. The second was a claim based on the 
subsequent downzoning by the City after the annexation alleging that the downzone was so 
severe as to constitute a regulatory taking. These are two entirely different governmental actions 
by different governmental entities giving rise to two distinct causes of action. The case bears no 
resemblance to the single CUP issued to Buckskin by the County. 
B. If the declaratory judgment claim is not otherwise barred, it is mooted 
by Resolution 11-6. 
As the District Court found, whatever right the County may have had under the CUP to 
require road improvement payments for future phases was given away by the County when it 
adopted Resolution 11-6. Buckskin notes that this was a resolution and not an ordinance. 
Appropriately so. The CIP was not adopted by ordinance, it was not mandated by ordinance, and 
no ordinance is required to abandon it. The resolution may not have the force and effect of a 
law, and the County, presumably, could change it prospectively as to others. Nonetheless, the 
resolution constitutes an unequivocal and binding waiver as to Buckskin. The County would 
have no problem with the Court saying so in its opinion. Were the County to act inconsistently 
with the assurances provided in the resolution, Buckskin could challenge such action under 
LLUP A by appealing the final plat for future phases. 
Buckskin insists that the threat of impact fees is still upon it because of the language it 
quotes from the County's zoning ordinance, LUDO. This misrepresents the plain meaning of 
that ordinance. See discussion in section ILC beginning on page 17. Despite having the words 
"impact fee" appear in the ordinance, LUDO's reference to Idaho Code § 31-870 makes it clear 
that there is nothing even arguably improper in the ordinance. 
C. If the declaratory judgment claim is not time-barred or moot, it is not 
yet ripe. 
Buckskin complains that Resolution 11-6 reserves the County's right to take into account 
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its authority and obligation to consider the availability of adequate public services in considering 
new applications for land developments. Rightly so, but in Buckskin's case the CUP has already 
been issued arid the roads have now been built. Consequently, it difficult to see how anything 
further could be required of Buckskin.26 Nevertheless, Buckskin complains that "it is highly 
questionable what, exactly, will be the subject of any such development agreement aside from 
the payment of road impact fees." Appellants' Brief at 26. If that is so, it only demonstrates that 
any claim based on future action by the County is not yet ripe. In the event that the County were 
to insist on new exactions beyond its power, Buckskin would have a new, ripe, and timely claim 
to make at that time. The law of ripeness makes clear that the Court should not entertain this 
claim until facts develop showing that harm will be suffered.27 
VI. COUNTIES HAVE AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
OUTSIDE OF SECTION 67-6511A. 
Buckskin raises an argument for the first time in its briefing on appeal that the County 
lacked the authority to enter into the Development Agreements with Buckskin because Idaho 
Code § 67-6511A provides the exclusive authority to enter into such agreements and it is limited 
to agreements associated with rezoning actions. The simple answer is that section 67-6511A is 
not the sole authority for local governments to enter into agreements respecting developments. 
Development agreements have been around for a long time and are critical to implementing land 
26 In another recent instance involving similar facts and a different developer, the County approved a new 
phase with no development agreement at all in light of Resolution 11-6. This is too recent to be in the record, but 
undersigned counsel represents this as true, and opposing counsel-who represents the developer-also knows it to 
be true. We do not offer this observation as evidence, but merely illustrative of the fact that there is no telling what 
may unfold, and that Buckskin is in no position today to claim harm is inevitable. Buckskin's statement that 
"Resolution 11-6 essentially states that payment of such fees will be required for approval of any application due to 
alleged impacts of the development," Appellants' Brief at 26, is simply not true, as the resolution shows. 
27 Buckskin, by the way, makes a fair point in observing that if the County were to enact an IDIF A-
complaint ordinance, it may not apply that ordinance retroactively to previously filed applications for development. 
The County has been so advised by its counsel, and there is no need for the Court to assume at this point that the 
County will attempt to apply any future ordinance unlawfully. If and when that were ever to occur, affected parties 
would have an opportunity to challenge it. 
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use policy. For example, the development agreement in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates v. Hailey 
("Sprenger Grubb 1"), 127 Idaho 576, 578-79, 903 P.2d 741, 743-44 (1995) had been in place 
since 1973. The practical reality is that development agreements are used by local governments 
and developers extensively throughout the State in virtually all contexts ofland use entitlements. 
Buckskin's suggestion that the Legislature's recognition of development agreements in the 
context of rezones thereby prohibits development agreements in any other context would tum the 
world ofland use planning upside down. 
In any event, this issue is raised too late. Buckskin never raised the issue with the 
County. It does not appear in the Complaint or the Notice of Appeal. It was not briefed below. 
And it should not be considered by the Court. "[I]ssues not raised below but raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed." Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. ofComm'rs, 
137 Idaho 118, 122,44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002). 
VII. BUCKSKIN'S CLAIMS ARE NOT CONTRACT CLAIMS AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Buckskin tries to avoid application ofthe four-year limitations period by arguing that 
Count 1 of its Complaint sounds in contract and is therefore subject to the five-year statute of 
limitations in Idaho Code § 5-216. The allegations in the Complaint belie this assertion. 
Nothing in Count 1 (or any other count) sounds in contract. Count 1 is entitled 
"Declaratory Relief - Violation of State Law and State and Federal Constitutions." Paragraph 18 
complains about the County's "practice" of imposing fees on developers. Paragraph 19 
complains that the County has not complied with IDIF A and that money collected "amounts to 
an unauthorized tax." Paragraph 20 also complains that monies collected "constitute an 
unauthorized tax." Paragraph 21 complains that because of these violations, the County cannot 
force "developers to pay monies under the guise of a Road Development Agreement and/or 
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Capital Contribution Agreement." In other words, Buckskin's contention is the County's actions 
are illegal in spite of the contracts, not because ofthe contracts. Moreover, none of the prayers 
for relief involve either damages for breach or any request for invalidation of the agreements. 
In sum, ignoring the words of its own Complaint, Buckskin now contends that Count 1 
seeks declaratory relief that the development agreements are illegal and void.28 This is simply 
not so. Buckskin's contract theory is plainly an afterthought-an effort to re-cast the Complaint 
in a way that was never intended solely to gain extra time under the statute oflimitations. 
The District Court properly rejected such semantic gamesmanship and looked to the 
nature of this case---which is plainly a takings case. It was on firm ground. "In determining the 
nature of the actions for limitations purposes, it is the substance or gravamen of the action, rather 
than the form of the pleading, that controls. In other words, in determining which statute of 
limitations governs an action, the court looks to the reality and essence of the action, and not to 
its name." 51 Am. Jur 2dApplication of Statutes of Limitation § 91 (2000)?9 Thus, the District 
Court was correct in declining to apply the five-year statute because "this is simply not an action 
based on a contract. It is an action based on inverse condemnation." Memorandum Decision (1) 
Plaintifft' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2) Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment, 
(3) Plaintifft' Motionfor Reconsideration/Amendment (4) Plaintifft' Motion To Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees at 5 (R. Vol. III, p. 581). 
Buckskin concedes that it has not pled breach of contract, but insists the statute is not 
28 Buckskin similarly mischaracterized its Count 1 in its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffi' Motion for 
Reconsideration/Amendment at 6 (R. Vol. III, p. 520). This error was pointed out to Buckskin, yet Buckskin persists 
in it before this Court. 
29 Another example of the need to look past the plaintiff's characterization of the case to its true basis is 
found in City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009). In that case, the City sued its attorneys for 
malpractice. It also included a claim for unjust enrichment, seeking return of the money paid to its attorneys. The 
District Court dismissed the latter claim, stating, "Although styled as a claim of unjust enrichment, Count Six is 
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limited to breach of contract. Yet it points the Court to not a single case supporting this 
conclusion. What case law is out there does not support its position. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals provided this helpful summary in 2008: 
Pursuant to I.e. § 5-216, an action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be filed 
within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues 
upon breach for limitations purposes. 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis supplied). This is 
consistent with the black letter law on the subject: 
The statute oflimitations begins to run in civil actions on 
contracts from the time the right of action accrues. This is usually 
the time the agreement is breached, rather than the time the actual 
damages are sustained as a consequence of the breach. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 160 (2000) (emphasis supplied). 
Buckskin's position is further weakened by the fact that it is alleging that there was no 
valid contract. In Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 318,160 P.3d 754,757 (2007), the Court 
found that the contract statute of limitations was inapplicable because the contract at issue was 
void ab initio. In other words, if Buckskin's theory of the case is that there was no valid 
contract, this is not an action "upon a contract." Instead, this is an action based on alleged 
constitutional and statutory violations, and is therefore subject to the four-year statute. 
Buckskin seems to believe that if a case's facts involve a contract, the lawsuit must be a 
suit "upon a contract." Not so. For example, the case of Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 
429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994), involved a single transaction (a court reporter's failure to 
prepare an accurate transcript) and various claims based on that event: § 1983, fraud, 
negligence, tortuous interference, and breach of contract. The Court carefully applied a different 
clearly premised upon legal malpractice." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld that portion of the District Court's decision. 
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statute of limitations to each claim, applying the contract statute of limitations only to the claim 
for breach of contract. The fact that a contract governed the entire action of the court reporter 
did not tum the rest of the case into a case "upon a contract." 
An analogy might illustrate. If someone made a contract to kill another person and then 
did so, the resulting homicide could give rise to a criminal prosecution and a wrongful death 
action-but not a suit "upon a contract." The problem with the killing is not that the contract 
was breached, but that it was carried out. In the case at bar, Buckskin's contention that this is a 
case "upon a contract" is no less misplaced. 
Even if the Court were to find the five-year statute applicable, this does not buy enough 
time to save Buckskin's lawsuit. The cutoff date for the five-year statute is December 1,2004. 
As detailed in Appendix A, numerous triggering events occurred prior to that date. 
VIII. THE COUNTY'S ORDINANCE WAS AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 67-6412 AND IS 
THEREFORE NOT AN ILLEGAL TAX. 
As the County noted in its trial brief, "Plaintiffs' lawsuit also fails on the merits." Valley 
County's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. Vol. I, p. 42). As noted 
above, however, the question of whether the subject road payments constitute an illegal tax has 
never been presented. Ifreached, however, Buckskin's claim fails on the merits. 
Buckskin's lawsuit is based on the well-settled principle that Idaho is a Dillon's Rule 
state. Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P .2d 517, 519 (1980). Accordingly, the power to 
tax (found in Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6) is separate from the police power, is not self-executing, 
and must be expressly conferred by the Legislature. Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene (HIBCA "), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. City of Pocatello , 
115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). If there is no express authorization, then the courts must 
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determine whether the regulatory exaction is a legitimate fee or an illegal tax. If there is an 
express authorization, then it is constitutionally permissible no matter what it is called.3o 
One instance in which the Legislature has granted the power to tax is IDIF A. IDIF A 
authorizes local governments, if they so elect, to enact ordinances for the imposition of 
development impact fees on new developments. IDIFA contains no mandate to do so, however. 
The statute is complex and technical, and relatively few Idaho governments have undertaken the 
expense of enacting an IDIF A-compliant ordinance. 
The absence of an IDIF A-compliant ordinance is determinative of nothing, because not 
all obligations imposed on developers outside of IDIF A are illegal taxes. Notably, LLUPA 
expressly authorizes local governments to impose conditions on developers seeking a CUp.31 
One type of expressly authorized condition is one "[r]equiring the provision for on-site or off-site 
public facilities or services." Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(6).32 That, of course, is exactly what 
Valley County did in the condition it imposed on Buckskin and other developers. 
In other words, Idaho Code § 67 -6512( d)( 6) is the express authorization that turns what 
might otherwise be an illegal tax into a permissible conditional requirement, thus meeting the 
constitutional standard articulated in IBCA and Brewster. In essence, Idaho Code 
30 Buckskin's repeated references to IDIF A suggest that it may misperceive this as a statutory rather than 
constitutional issue. But it is not IDIF A that causes some impact fees to be illegal taxes. If they are illegal, they 
would be illegal even if IDIF A did not exist. The thing that makes them illegal, if they are illegal, is the non-self-
executing nature of the grant of taxation authority in Idaho's Constitution. To put it differently, IDIFA does not 
occupy the field for establishing legal taxes. There are numerous examples of legal taxes that are not imposed 
pursuant to IDIF A, e.g., ad valorem taxes. 
31 The terms "conditional use permit" and "special use permit" are synonymous under LLUP A. Idaho 
Code § 67-6512(a). 
32 Another type of condition expressly authorized by the Legislature is this: "Requiring mitigation of 
effects of the proposed development upon service delivery by any political subdivision, including school districts, 
providing services within the planned jurisdiction." Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(8). In addition, governments may 
impose fees for services. Idaho Code § § 31-870 and 63-1311. All of these things may be done without enacting an 
ordinance pursuant to IDIF A. 
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§ 67-6512(d)(6) is a mini-IDIFA of very limited scope.33 
This makes sense. Local governments have a responsibility to ensure that development 
does not proceed in the absence of adequate public facilities and services. Indeed, this is 
fundamental to the land use planning process. As noted above, governments have the discretion 
to deny or delay development approvals where there is inadequate infrastructure to support them. 
Idaho Code §§ 67-6512(a), 67-6512(d)(2). Rather than bar all new development until funds for 
infrastructure become available from general revenues, grants, or otherwise, section 67-6512 
provides another option. It allows the local government to condition the development in a way 
that allows that infrastructure to be provided by the developer. 
This is nothing new. Section 67-6512 predates IDIFA (which was enacted in 1992) and 
dates back to the enactment ofLLUPA in 1975. Nothing in IDIFA overrides this authority. One 
might ask, however, if this authority predates IDIFA, why did the Legislature enact IDIF A? The 
answer is simple. Section 67-6512 is very narrow. It is available only to developers who 
approach the city or county seeking a CUP. IDIF A is far broader, authorizing local governments 
to impose impact fees on anyone who subdivides property, pulls a building permit, or does 
anything else requiring approval. 
When the Legislature enacted IDIFA, it was cognizant ofLLUPA and took steps, where 
it deemed appropriate, to ensure that governments did not use their LLUP A powers to sidestep 
IDIFA. It amended LLUPA's provision dealing with subdivision to say: "Fees established for 
purposes of mitigating the financial impact of development must comply with the provisions of 
chapter 82, title 67, Idaho Code [IDIFA]." Idaho Code § 67-65l3. In contrast, it did not amend 
33 Because section 67-6512 is limited to "public facilities and services," it would not save the affordable 
housing ordinances overturned by districts courts in Mountain Central Ed. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case 
No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19,2008) (reproduced in Appendix B) and Schaefer v. City 
of Sun Valley, Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., July 3,2007) (reproduced in Appendix C). 
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or restrict the corresponding power to impose conditions on CUPs found in section 67-6512(d). 
In short, the County's crp and the conditions it imposed on Buckskin and others are 
expressly authorized by the Legislature in section 67-6512(d) and therefore are not illegal taxes. 
IX. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES DICTATE DISMISSAL OF BUCKSKIN'S LAWSUIT. 
Buckskin benefited substantially from its arrangement with the County. As a result of the 
crp and the Development Agreements, Buckskin did not have to wait for the County to find the 
money elsewhere to build roads. Those roads are now in place, and The Meadows continues to 
benefit from an improved regional road network. Despite those benefits, Buckskin says it should 
get its money back. 
Equitable principles, however, prevent Buckskin from having its cake and eating it, too. 
Buckskin should not prevail in its attempt to profit from what amounts to reneging on an explicit 
agreement regarding a fair and reasonable way to finance the road improvements that enabled 
The Meadows to be built. But for the Development Agreements, Buckskin and other developers 
would most likely be sitting on undevelopable land served by dirt or gravel roads. To allow 
them to enter agreements, receive their permits, make payments without objection or appeal, 
watch the roads be built, sell lots, and then sue years later is inequitable. 
First, equity abhors the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another, and it is 
a general principle oflaw that one should be required to make restitution of benefits received, 
retained, or appropriated from another. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 8 
(2001). Allowing Buckskin to recover the payment it made to the County would result in the 
unjust enrichment of Buckskin at the expense of the County. See Barry v. Pacific West 
Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004) (general contractor was unjustly 
enriched by uncompensated work of subcontractor). 
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Second, someone who perfonns substantial services for another without an express 
agreement for compensation ordinarily becomes entitled to the reasonable value of those 
services. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 37 (2001). Even ifthere had been 
no agreement between the parties, the fact remains that the County perfonned the substantial 
service of designing, financing, and building the road network to serve The Meadows. Under 
this theory of quantum meruit, the County is entitled to the reasonable value of the work and 
material provided to Buckskin. The contributions under the Development Agreements represent 
Buckskin's share of the reasonable value of this work, and should not be refunded. 
Third, courts in equity can use "promissory estoppel" to enforce a promise made without 
consideration when the following elements are present: (i) the detriment suffered in reliance on 
the promise was substantial in an economic sense; (ii) the substantial loss to the promisee acting 
in reliance was, or should have been, foreseen by the promisor; and (iii) the promisee must have 
acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. Us. 
Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857,862 (Ct. App. 2000). Put another 
way, "the doctrine requires only that it be foreseeable to the promisor that the promisee would 
take some action or forbearance in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer 
substantial loss if the promise were to be dishonored." Rule Sales, 133 Idaho at 675,991 P.2d at 
863. In this action, by trying to get its money back, Buckskin is essentially claiming a right to 
take back its promise to pay. But the County already relied on that promise and, reasonably and 
justifiably, suffered a substantial economic detriment in response. To allow Buckskin to 
dishonor its promise now would be a great injustice. 
Fourth, the equitable principle of laches provides that a plaintiff is estopped from 
asserting the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in asserting these rights; 
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(ii) the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the defendant did not know 
that the plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would injure or prejudice the 
defendant. Finucane v. Village o/Hayden, 86 Idaho 199,205,384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). All 
those tests are met here. Allowing Buckskin to recover the road construction costs will result in 
a windfall to Buckskin and an unfair detriment to the County. The undisputed facts in the record 
show that Buckskin did not raise any objection to any action of the County. Buckskin claims 
that it did not object because it assumed the County's actions were lawful. That is, in effect, an 
admission that it did not question the County's actions, and, in any event, it is insufficient to 
overcome the equities favoring the County. 
Finally, the equitable concept of "waiver" applies in an action for breach of contract and 
states that "a party who accepts the other's performance without objection is assumed to have 
received the performance contemplated by the agreement." 17 A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 640 
(2001). "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage [and 
the] party asserting the waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon such a waiver and 
reasonably altered his position to his detriment." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d 
219, 224 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, Buckskin has breached its contract with the County by bringing 
this lawsuit. The principles behind the concept of waiver instruct that Buckskin cannot now 
complain that the terms of the Development Agreements were unacceptable. Until this suit was 
filed, Buckskin did not characterize the Development Agreements as establishing an illegal 
impact fee. Had Buckskin done so, the County could have taken Buckskin's arguments into 
account and responded accordingly before committing resources. Waiver principles should 
prevent Buckskin from backing out of its Development Agreements. 
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Finally, the County's adoption of Resolution 11-6 demonstrates clearly its bona fides. 
Given all of the County's defenses and the legitimacy of the actions under Idaho Code 
§ 67-6512, it could have pressed Buckskin and other developers to continue making payments 
under existing contracts. Instead, it took the high road and said it will not do so. 
X. THE COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES; BUCKSKIN IS NOT. 
A. The standards under Idaho Code § 12-117 and 12-121 are functionally 
identical. 
The County seeks attorney fees under both Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code 
§ 12-121.34 Under Idaho Code § 12-117, prevailing parties in civil actions involving a state 
agency or local government and a private entity as adverse parties may recover their costs and 
attorney fees where they can show that the non-prevailing party acted "without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-121 reads like a pure prevailing party statute but is 
modified by Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1), which states: "Provided, attorney fees under section 12-
121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, 
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
This Court has essentially equated the two standards.35 Accordingly, the discussion of fee 
awards under Idaho Code § 12-117 will include some case law arising under section 12-121. 
B. The County is entitled to fees under Idaho Code 12-117. 
This case satisfies the threshold requirements in Idaho Code § 12-117: the case is a civil 
action involving a governmental entity and private entities as adverse parties. If the County 
34 There is a line of authority holding that, if section 12-117 is available, it is exclusive and section 12-121 
is unavailable. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 
(2010). On other occasions, the Court has applied both sections 12-117 and 12-121. E.g., Total Success I and Total 
Success II. Therefore, we have included the claim under section 12-121 out of an abundance of caution. 
35 Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. ("Total Success II',), 148 Idaho 688, 695, 
227 P.3d 942,949 (Ct. App. 2010); Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC ("Total Success 
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prevails, all that remains to establish is that Buckskin pursued the matter without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
Where parties ignore settled precedent, as Buckskin did here, they are subject to a 
mandatory award of fees under section 12-117. Unlike other attorney fee provisions, section 12-
117 does not entail an exercise of discretion. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 
109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). This Court has ruled that failure to address controlling appellate 
decisions and failure to address factual or legal findings of the district court equates to pursuing 
litigation without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Health and 
Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 240, 192 P.3d 1058, 1064 (2008). Other examples of parties paying the 
price for ignoring settled precedent are found in Excell Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of 
Commerce and Labor, 145 Idaho 783, 793, 186 P.3d 639,649 (2008) (attorney fees awarded 
against agency that failed to apply a case whose relevant facts were "virtually 
indistinguishable"), and Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) 
(attorney fees may be awarded when "the law is well-settled,,).36 In Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 415, 258 P.3d 340, 350 (2011), the Court awarded attorney 
fees against the plaintiff noting: "Allied misrepresented controlling precedent in its briefing, and 
also presented multiple arguments in its briefing that it abandoned at oral argument. Further, 
Allied unreasonably pursued this appeal even though it failed to comply with the notice 
requirement of the ITCA and the bond requirement ofLC. § 6-610." Although the case at bar 
does not involve the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Buckskin pursued this action and this appeal in 
I"), 145 Idaho 360, 372,179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008); Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 207,177 P.3d 949,954 
(2008); Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007). 
36 The same holds true under Idaho Code § 12-121. "Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal does no 
more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is 
well settled and appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." Johnson v. 
Edward, 113 Idaho 660, 662, 747 P.2d 69, 71 (1987). 
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defiance of settled authority on the statute of limitations, KMST, exhaustion, and a host of federal 
defenses (which Buckskin challenged vigorously below but did not appeal). 
This Court has often described the purpose ofthis statute as follows: "First, it serves 'as 
a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless 
charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made.'" Reardon v. Magic 
Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340,343 (2004) (brackets original). 
In State of Idaho v. Estate of Joe Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439-40, 111 P.3d 121, 124-25 
(2005), the Court quoted the dual purposes of the statute recited above and declared that both 
were violated. "The action was groundless because the Department clearly waited too long to 
present its claim .... It is appropriate to discourage such action. Further, the Department's 
action placed an unjustified financial burden on the Estate." Id. The same can be said here. 
Ironically, the very case that hung Buckskin on the statute oflimitations, McCuskey II, 
also compels an attorney fee award. The McCuskey II Court dismissed the inverse condemnation 
claim as time barred on the basis of prior precedent, concluding therefore that fees should be 
awarded. 37 The precedent is now all the more settled and the basis for a fee award against 
Buckskin is even more compelling. 
C. The County may also be eligible for an award under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. 
For all the reasons cited above, the Court should award attorney fees under section 
12-121 as well. The County acknowledges that, as a practical matter, the section 12-121 claim 
37 The fee award in McCuskey II was made under Idaho Code § 12-121, not § 12-117, which, at the time, 
was a one-way street and did not allow counties to obtain fee awards against private parties. As noted in section 
X.A at page 46, however, the standards under the two statutes are essentially identical. 
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does not appear to add anything to the analysis or to the relief.38 The County includes this 
seemingly redundant claim for purposes of completeness in the event that, for some reason, 
section 12-117 were found to be unavailable. 
D. Buckskin is not entitled to attorney fees. 
Even if this Court were to overturn the District Court, Buckskin would not be entitled to 
fees because the County has defended this suit fairly and reasonably. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of this suit. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2011. 
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Appendix A TIMETABLE OF KEy EVENTS 
Date Document or Comments 
Event 
4/1/2004 Buckskin's This application included as Appendix 
Application for C a Proposed Development 
CUP (all Agreement and a Proposed Capital 
phases) Contribution Agreement. The 
paragraph on "Road Improvements" in 
the Capital Contribution agreement 
says "Developer agrees to pay a road 
impact fee as established by Valley 
County. Currently this fee has been 
set by the Valley County Engineer at 
$1,870.00 per equivalent single-family 
residential unit. ... " Appendix D to the 
Application is an "Impact Report." It 
states: "The original estimated cost to 
complete this roadway improvements 
was $6,000,000.00. The development 
is proposing in the Development 
Agreement to a road impact fee as 
established by Valley County. 
Currently this fee has been set by the 
County Engineer at $1,870.00 per 
equivalent single-family residential 
unit. Road impact fees may be offset 
by developer contribution of right-of-
way or in-kind construction." 
5/17/2004 P&Z hearing on P&Z voted to recommend approval of 
CUP (all CUP. Joe Pachner speaking for 
phases) applicant: "The traffic report 
completed by the Tamarack Resort 
has been incorporated into the design 
of this project. The impact of this 
project using this roadway is 
incorporated and they will pay their 
proportional impact fees." 
Pat Dobie, County Engineer: "[A] fee 
of approximately $1,800 per residential 
unit will be required to construct the 
roads." 
5/21/2004 Buckskin's This revision contained the same 
revised proposed agreements as were 
Application for included in the initial application on 
CUP (all April 1 ,2004. 
phases) 
6/10/2004 P&Z Findings Recommended Condition #12: 'The 
and Development Agreement and Capital 
Conclusions (all Contribution Agreement must receive 
phases) approval from the Board of County 
Commissioners." 
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The application is dated Herrick 
"March 2004" on the Aff., Exh. 3 
footer. The cover letter 
is dated 3-24-2004. The (The 
acceptance by Jack Affidavit of 
Charters is dated 3-29- Cynda 
2004. It is also signed at Herrick in 
the end by Jack Charters Support of 
on 3-29-2004. Motion for 
According to the Summary 
County's planning staff, Judgment 
it was actually filed on 4- is an 
1-2004. exhibit to 
the Clerk's 
Record on 
Appeal.) 
Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 6 
Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 4 
The date is unclear on Herrick 
the copy in the record. Aff., Exh. 7 
We have confirmed that 
the correct date is 6-10-
04. 
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Date Document or Comments 
Event 
7/12/2004 County Voted to approve the CUP. The 
Commissioners' minutes contain a discussion of Capital 
hearing on CUP Contribution Agreement and 
(all phases) acceptance of the conveyance of right-
of-way in lieu of cash. 
7/14/2004 CUP issued by Although approved by the Board of 
P&Z (all County Commissioners on 7-12-2004, 
phases) it is the P&Z which issued the CUP 
document. Condition #12 reads: "The 
Development Agreement and Capital 
Contribution Agreement must receive 
approval from the Board of County 
Commissioners." The District Court 
noted this in his decision, concluding 
that "the Plaintiffs certainly knew the 
essential facts" by this date. R. Vol. III, 
p.490. 
7/14/2004 Capital Applies to Phase 1. Fee set at 
Contribution $79,292 (based on $1,844 per single 
Agreement - family lot). Paid via a conveyance of 
Phase 1 right of way with a credit for 
overpayment. One of the recitals 
states: "Developer has agreed to 
participate in the cost of mitigating 
these impacts by contributing its 
proportionate fair share of the cost of 
the needed improvements identified in 
the Agreement and listed on the 
attached Exhibit A." 
9/9/2004 P&Z hearing on Approved final plat for Phase 1. 
application for Minutes state at page 3: "They also 
final plat- discussed the maintenance of private 
Phase 1 roads, the dedication of public right of 
way, and that $1,844 per lot will be 
paid toward road maintenance." 
10/25/2004 County Approved final plat for Phase 1. 
Commission Minutes state at page 2: "[A]ccept the 
hearing on dedication of public right-of-way along 
application for Norwood Road and West Roseberry 
final plat- Road; ... agree that the Development 
Phase 1 Agreement that is in place covers off-
site road improvement costs for this 
phase." This is the date on which the 
District Court said the statute of 
limitations ran '[a]t the very latest." R. 
Vol. III, p. 490. 
12/1/2004 Cutoff date for If the 5-year statute applies and the 
5-year statute cause of action accrued prior to this 
of lim itations date, the lawsuit is untimely. 
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Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 
10 
The CUP is dated 7-14- Herrick 
2004. Aff., Exh. 
It was recorded on the 11 
same day as Instrument 
#285115. 
The text of the CUP 
states that the effective 
date is 7/13/2004. 
Executed by Buckskin Herrick 
on 7-14-2004. Executed Aff., Exh. 1 
by County on 7-26-2004. 
Recorded as Instrument 
285976 on 8-4-2004. 
The text of the 
agreement gives the 
date as 7-12-2004. 
Herrick, 
Aff., Exh. 
14 
Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 
15 
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9/8/2005 P&Z hearing on Approved final plat for Phases 2 & 3. 
application for Minutes state at page 8: U[A] letter 
final plat- from Parametrics, Valley County 
Phases 2 & 3 Engineer, dated September 8, 2005, 
stating that Valley County will require a 
Road Development Agreement .... " 
9/26/2005 County Approved final plat for Phases 2 & 3. 
Commission Minutes explain at page 5 that this was 
hearing on originall presented as phase 2, but is 
application for now for phases 2 & 3. 
final plat-
Phases 2 & 3 
9/26/2005 Road One of the recitals states: "Developer 
Development has agreed to participate in the cost of 
Agreement - mitigating these impacts by 
Phases 2 & 3 contributing its proportionate fair share 
of the cost of the needed 
improvements identified in the 
Agreement and listed on the attached 
Exhibit A." Fee set at $247,096, less 
credit from Phase 1, requiring cash 
payment of $232,160. Based on 
$1,844 per single family lot and $1,383 
per apartment unit. (The agreement 
references Phase 2, but this was 
renamed Phases 2 & 3. See Minutes 
of 9-26-2005.) 
12/1/2005 Cutoff date for If the 4-year statute applies and the 
4-year statute cause of action accrued prior to this 
of limitations date, the lawsuit is untimely. 
12/15/2005 Check for Payment made for Phases 2 & 3 per 
$232,160 Road Development Agreement. 
payable to 
Valley County 
12/1/2007 Cutoff date for If the cause of action accrued prior to 
2-year statute this date, the federal claim is untimely. 
of limitations 
12/1/2009 Com plaint filed 
11/7/2011 Resolution 11-6 The resolution states in section 2: "In 
order to avoid litigation costs and 
uncertainty, the Board of County 
Commissioners will no longer enter 
into Road Development Agreements 
calling for the payment of fees or other 
contributions for off-site road 
improvements until such time as the 
County adopts an IDIFA-compliant 
ordinance, unless the permit holder 
voluntarily and expressly waives any 
objection thereto." 
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Herrick 
Aff., Exh. 
17 
Herrick 
Aff., 
Exh.18 
Executed by all parties Herrick 
on 9-26-2005. Text Aff., Exh. 2 
recites 9-26-2005 as 
date of agreement. 
Recorded as Instrument 
#300816 on 9-27-2005. 
Herrick 
Aff., f[ 23 
R. Vol. I, p. 
1 
R. Vol. III, 
pp.552-53 
Page 52 
MO lTNTAINCENTRAL BD. OF REALTORS V. CITY OF MCCALL Appendix B (./, 
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1.2 
a_No Inr.t.Mo~~_ 
, F.""4 .<IO'Q'IM 
IN 1'.BE DISTRICT COURT Ol' THE Fou.am JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATB OP IDAHO, IN AND paR. 1l!5 COUN'tY OFVAlLBY 
MODmAn-l CBNTRALBOARJ) OF 
R.EALTOIlS. lNC., an Idaho N01'lN .Pro:fit 
ColpOn.tion. 
PJa.!nti'f't 
VB. 
CITY OF MCCALL. I. rnunicl~al OOl'poration of 
the Slate of Ids.hos 
Dav.(d O:ranan. and Victor Villegas, 1br the PabJtiW 
Case No. CV 2006-4g0..c 
MBMORANDtlM t'lSCiSION 
AND O.RDlm GIt.ANrINO 
PLa'INl"lP.P'S MO'l'IONFOR. 
ST.1MMA'RY 1Ul>GM2NT 
l' WUliam A. MolTOW. Cb:ia101'her D. Gabbert. mll~ Jm S. HoJlnica, for the Oefen&ut 
;1'1 'rbi, matter came before the Court fo1' oral argument Otl. July 13. :!007, regarding 1?la.il\illr 
1.* Motion for Summlllj" Judgment. Oa.luly 14, 2007, Plail1tifftlled a Noth:o ofSuppJementaI A~lthoril:y. 
:1.11 
.FACTUAL AND PR.OCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The faats rand prccodutal hWOlY of this case were set fot1h in more detail in the Court's 
:n. 
22 p~ously .filed Memorandum DeOlSiQ.rt and Older DM)'inS the Defucbmt City oEMc;CaIl's Motlou 
:u -Summar)' Judgment on the issue of stand ill,. Bs9ant:ially. PhUutlffis challensm,g ~ cOIlstltll11onallty 0 
;)4 two ordintAnr;es passed ill liebnlluy of 2006 by thel City of McCall: Ordiqanee ~o. 819 whieh i6 
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1 
2 
1 
7 
8 
10 
16 
19 
20 
a\ 
1I0llsing fee ordinance. I Such otdLnances were enacted to ensure a.Ild provide for at'J'oTdable houslng in 
lile City of McCall. 
Vnder Ord!naD.ce No. 8t9, aU appl!cstions for n~ sltbdiv~ioDS ere Yequhed to submit 
iJ;JalUBionary housing plan Pl'oviding tl:I.t\t twenty petcellt (20%) of tots and houses be permanently cit;d-
restricted as affordable c:ommun1ty housing as a preco7ldition to plat approval. Spccifiar.lly, OrdiUl1IIlle 
No. 819 is desigu.ed to prQVide for "COlm1Iunity ho\,JS!ng to bill affo~ble to City of McCall housobolds 
with incomes In categorIes m and IV as definecun subseotloll 2, Commun1ty HousiJla by Income." C' 
of McCall OtdilUltlCC No. 819, f !l,1.10(A). These eatcsortes define moderate to middle income. 
C~SOry m luclwies howeholds With incOllles greater than one h_ad peI'CCIlt (1000h) bllt not m01' 
than Otte hund.rod twenty percent (120%) oftbc Valley Co'Ul'lty median b01.1Sehold In.cOll1e. Category 'N 
includes hot.lsellolcls with incomes greater than one hundroci 1Want)' percent (120'*) but not UJ,ote than 
one hundred sixty percent (160%) of the Valley CountymedUm housebold income. 
There CU'C 10m' ways by which an. applicant for subdivWion approval may ll1eet the rcquireme.a: 
of OrdiJ18llC1l No. 819: (1) the first priorlty is to pmnalleJ1tly deed .cestrlcc tWenty parcen1 (20%) of the 
land. within \he Inlbdivisfon for aft'ol'dable holJll1q, called "C!n~sitetl housing; (2) the second priority ls to 
coustrIlOt such holJ$ing "of.f-sitc" fi'om 1he proposed subQivisionf (l) the thi..td Plio:1ty is to COD,vey la.n • 
and (4) lbe fo\.1rthpriorlty is to pay a fee io.lieu of the previoUS three Op6QlUl. 
I AlthouQh o~~~nanae No. 8~9 ~s :a~erred to aa ~ne ~na1us1Qnary zQn~n9 op.d1nan~e ~n 
Ordin!lnce No. 820 is Iohlll l~n~age O%I.UnanQ~, the Court gene:t'aJ,ly relie:t's ~fl t.h~$ 
aec1aiQn to both Qrdina~ce~ as ~~Qlu510fl~=Y lonin; o:t'QinaAc@s. 
~ Xf cOIIlllI\UU.cy houBinq ;Ls ClOn!:ltlroot.ed of.E-s~t6, the re.qult:l!c:I percenta.91!1 or len 
&lloo~~ed to af~ordaDle housln; ieareasee ft:om twen~y pe~cent (20~) of ~he 
Jr~ndon l.eonlS 1:0 one hundl;ed twentr-Uve pel:'oel:lt. 1125t:1 if tbe hous.1na ~s baUt. 
within tae oity of ~Cal1; or to one hundzaa fiEuy pe%c9n~ (150'1 ~f the "~~~1n, 1s 
~u.1l1: I'Iithin the oll:y ,loS.mitlS of anott\sr munLc1pa.l..!:l:y loeatea :in valhy 0,," Ad 
Count1e21 or ~ t~o ~Uh~»ed PQ~cent (200~) 1£ the houA~n; iB ~u1Lt witnin 
unlnco=po~atea valley Or Adam~ Countlas. 
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1 
Under Otdinatic~ No. 820, all appJieams 1W a building psnnit are requil~d to pa.y a communi 
2 housing fee for each resid.enti.a1 dwelling unit thIt is proportiOllBl to the demand for community bou.·dng 
3 creat=Q by the: dw&lJ.irIg unit OrdinaJlce No. 820 is desiped. to benefit employees of' low or modera 
lncome in cateSOrles 1 aru:t II who are needed to .t'IUIitItlin and. se:mce the resi4ential c!wallillg ullit.3 Lo 
5 
7 
a 
10 
11 
111 
17 
1S 
19 
20 
23 
24 
25 
iAcome ill dofitted in Category I 11$ households with incomes gyeater than ftfty petc02ll. (50%) but no 
more tban eighty percent (80%) ofdle Valley COUl1ty medlan h01.lSchold inoOIJle. Income Category 
inQludes housoholds with iDcomes srea=- than eighty percent (80%) but IWt more t.ban one hUndred 
percent (100%) of the Valley County mediaa. bOlllchold mc:ome. Certain residential development is 
elCClhpted 1m. OrdInance No. 820 S\'Ich as redevelopment, mnodeling 01 reTocatiM of i!.IlY I~gally pre-
exi6ting residentlal unit, expanJiloa up to SOO square feet, mobile: homE!, ~lcillec;l .IlW'$il\g facilities 
retirement or 1Ul~ living homes, !bater homes, ancl community housing Ul11b. City of McCall 
Ordlna.a.ce No. 820, § 3.8.21(C). 
Plaintiff filed a ve:r!fied Complaint 011 September 22. 2005, seeldng declaratory relief that tile 
City ot'McCllIl's OrciiD.ance Numbers 81 9 and $20 violate both State ~ PeaCl;(I.1laws an4 constitutions, 
and seck.lng a pennallent illjWl.t!tion ~ohung the City frOlU enfoteing SI.\;!J. 01'd.i'OtmCCS against its 
members. Defendallt filed an AnsWer on October 18, 2006, MSerting a number of afi'innative defeIlSe$ 
.lneludina no jUsUciablo case or oontroversy. r!pene~s. sta.n.c!ins, failure to JOw an indispensable party 
~ O~d~nance No. 820 defines the ccmmUn!ty nO~Bing fee as fo~lon8: 
~he =o~uni~y housinq fee shall be aammenaurate with the ~urrGnt 
cOIl1II\1anity housing .subSidy amoW1t requirect to deveJ.op aZ'ld c:cnu'i::rucn;: 
CO!llm\loI'lj. l:!y .b.O'J.s.Lnro zo:r: ::i:ft.y (IlO I pS:l'oent of the eDlp.l.oyeell need.Eld. to 
m!l1nl:.ilin and saX'vic:e t:h. dwdl.1n9 unit and ~ho l'Lave l.nc:lQlllEl$ in !ncOlllO 
el1t~'lIO:r:.:hlll :r and U. The nurr,be<t of el1\Plcyees n9scled. to lIIa;i.nt:/ilill 111M 
Ae&vico the ~e$1dential unit va~le8 baaed on ehe sise of the uni~. 
City of N~ll O:r:~nanQe ~o. B20, § 3.8.21(D) (11 (e). 
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Plaintiff filed II. Motion tbl' SummIilY Judp.ent el.ong with a Motion to 'FiI", Brlef F..xceedi,n 
3 Twenty~Five ('25) Pages 01. November 20, 2006. Th.I.s CO\l1t cntsred an Order Grauting Plamtifra 
Motion to Pile Brlef:&ceeding ~Flve (25) l'aaes on NOYenlber 29. 20015. On. December 6, 2006 
5 the part.l.es filed II. Stipwated U1igati011 g,bedule. Defendant filed 8. Sti!mJation to &teeCQ Page Limit on 
6 Felmlaxy 7, 2007. allowing 'Defendant tQ file a Response Brld in excess of the twenty-five paplimiJ;. 
7 
Or) May 22. 2007, this Court issued a Me.m.oranclum Deoision lII1d Order ,Oenyi!1g thl! Defendant 
City of McCall's Motion for SUlXImaty J'uQgme:n~ hold;ng tbat the Plaintiff did have "'ass c:latlOlUll" 
starlding to nU:SUO its OlaiIll. On lvIay 31, 2007, the PlIrtiflS filed a Stipulation to Ameud Litigatio lO ,,-
l.l. SWdalc:. Also on Lh.at date, Pla.intifffiled all Am.e.Ilded Notic!! ofHsllri:og. 
1:< STANDARD OF RE'V'JEW 
U Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides thal Sl.UrlIllat'Y judgment is proper when 
~4 satisfied tha.t "there is no ge.nuh1e issue as to any material faet a:ad that the moving Party is tltlee to 
15 juasm~t as a m.s.tter of taw." I.R-C.P. S5(c). AU disputed fQ4rts are to b~ resolved and all eA90Ilable 
16 
inf'ml:lce.s dIa-wn.i:tJ. favor of the non-movinB party. See Slq/Jord 11. K/aste1'W/l:In. 134 Idsllo 20 
17 
lS 
P.2d 111&, 1119 (2000); Smith 1I. MBrJaSrl1! JOint Sch. Di&1. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 ,ld 583, 
3811 (1996). If'reasonable persons could. reach dlHerent :fi~lnes or drll.W con:tlieting inf'eretJ\:" u 
20 evld.s~e, the rnatlon nlulrt be denied. Jordan" • .Beek.;, llS Idaho S86, S90. 21 P.~cl 908, 91 (2001); 
21 SmIth, 128 Idaho at 718> 918 P.2d at 587. 
22 The dIstrict court as tho trier of fact may draw TllIBonll.ble inferences based upon the EWjdence 
2;1 before It BIld ,!lt8.)' grant 8Um1'll8J:y judgment despite the possibili'tY of cO%lflicting l.nfet'enCtl$. Kn erm~m v. 
2t 
26 
JQme.~D"'! 132ldaho 910, 913. 9S0 p,2d 574,577 (Ct. App. 1999) (oiting Cameron 'II_ Neal. lO Idaho 
898,900. 9SD P.ld 1237. 1.239 (1997». SIIB Q}.ro Iclaho CodeAzln. § 10~1201 (2005). 'Wh.ere e maUtl 
M\i}~tM . !)l!IC:S:tON l\JIID 0lU)~ .. 2?AG3 4 
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would be Uied Without II. j\U"Y. the coun: iii "free 10 arrive at tbe most prcbable inferences tAl be 41's: 
\ 
2. ..from uncontroverted evldentla:y faotg," lAomf.s 1'. City ofHallr:y, 119 Idaho 434, 437. 807 P.2d 1272. 
3 1275 (1991); Qccord S/einer 'II, Zisg/1il7~1'alml,.a Ltd.. 138 Idaho 238. 241,61 p.3d 595,598 (2004), T 
the evidcntiozy facts are not in diapute, tIle trial ccuzt m~ grant SUl,D..IntI.ty judgment despite 
~ possibility' of QQnflicting i~ces, bocau;sc: tIle court alone will be ill the position of resolvillg 
6 COl'lructlu3~ attrlal. Rtver8itie Devolopm4nl Co. v. Rftchie, l03)dsho SIS, 519, 650 P.2d 6S7. 
1 
Il 
10 
11 
661 (UI82). 
In o'Cder to challenge the constltll1ionsllty of a statut. or a'l'd.l.!:ulnce, the plaintiifhas the burden. 0 
showing the invalidity of such statute or regulation and must overcome the st:roT\g prel!1.llnplion 0 
VIIl!dity. Olal:n 11. J.A, Frftsman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990); see also Wyc:.to 
12 v. Board qf COllnly Commissioners, 101 Idaho la. 14. 607 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1980). '"It Is pnemll 
13 pmum.ed that legislative ac:ts are constitutional, that the state legislature bas acted within i 
ccnstitutioual powers, and any doubl t!oncernillg inte:rF&tation ofa statutei:l to be re.'\olvcd III t.vor 0 
15 
that which will re~er1he sratute qcmstitutionaJ." Olton, 1 17 Idaho a.t 709. 7911'.2d at 12815. The p 
aS8ertipg tI. facial dlallenge to an ordlnance must demOllStrate That the "law is 1ll!Constitu.tiOl1I11. I.e. all 0 
l' 
i.1i applioations .•.. {And] that no set: of ~~ exieta under wblc:h the (law) would be VlIlld." 
1ll 
lJ) Arn6l'icQn. Falla Reservoir Dist. No.2 v.ldaho Dtp't ofW4tlfr RcSDW't:eJ, 1431da40 862, _, 154 P,] 
2Q 433,0441 (2007) (internal qI.Jote$ omitted.). 
21 DISCUSSION 
:t2 InQlusio11lllY zonms ordi:nancea appear 10 be II. recent trend ill the etforts "f loeal communi'tie$, 
2:3 especill.ll.y in seasonal econoTllf-based co;mmunities, to address the needs ofpro'\liding B£fQrllable I\ousin 
2$ 
for the local worJd'ol'Ce. li:1cl~&lQnruy :a:oru.ng or iw;llJlliollSIy bous.ing ordinances gener.ally l'oqu1:c 
residential devetol't'!r to set aside a ,,Pecific p~centase of new Ilou!ring unlts t'Qf low or moderate ~come 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1332095~34, 10915-9 
Page 57 
a 
8 
10 
1.2 
lG 
11 
19 
20 
21 
24 
household$. Home Blilldsrl A.I'ol' 'n of Nonhal'/S California v. CIt)! of Nap", 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 60, 62 n.l 
(Cal, Ct. App. 2001) (oiting l$n M. P!U1Wa. RejlectiolSS on '"aJusiolfD1')l Houfling and a It_newad Loo/1 
at its Yiablliljl. 23 HofstraL. Rev. S39, 540 (1995»).4 
\Vhile a .!lumber of' jurhdictlons have case law discussing the con.st!tu.tioC81ity en inehulon 
zonirlg otdlD.ar.1ce!, there ill no cue precedent wbiQll W b~ established in Idaho. Furtber.(llOt'e, there is 
710 legislative authol'ity in Idaho providing fo~ iUQlusioXWy zoning provisions. Altb.oug/111l,lt cDDI:rolling, 
this Court is a.ware that a Decision on Surnmllly JudJlllc::b1. was rued My 3. 2007. in Blaine Cow 
reprding en 8.'1-appliad clJallenge to tile City of Sun Vallq-'s Workforce Housing Linkage Ordin 
No. 364, in Scht1.fJ1jer v. City oj Sun Val/fIJI. Idaho, CQC No. CV -06·882. 
In the case bef'Ore this Court, there are no geJ:luine i.!sues of matertal :fact, The dispositive issue i 
the purely legal question of whether Ordinauce Nos. 819 aDd 820 me propet' police !,owel: teguJations 0 
till: City of .McCQIl. This Court defe.rs to the City of McCa.Il's detennitlation of a lack: of affordable 
hOl.Ull11a and to their laudable intention to address the i~e; the question for this Court. however. i. 
whether the methods of remedying this hoUSing shortfall pass legal m.uster. 
In Idaho. "a lll.1.lJliclpal corporation may exercise o.llly those powers itl!lI1ted to it by eithli!,t' Ih 
state llonstitutiO.ll or tbeJesIsllI.ture •••• n CQe8"rv. Slr;:te. l011dabo ISS, 160,610 P.ld 517,519 (1980). 
Article 12, Seotiol1l of the Tclaho State Constitution prOvides for arty county, city, OT r.owtt to make II1l 
enforce all such local police. swtaIy. and ather regulatlOllB which are nOi in collfliet with. its clwter 
with lhe genera11aws. Idaho Canst, Art. 12 § 2. 'I'h= Idaho Supreme Coutt ha5 fecogni2ed that "[l]h 
• lfo.tJ Bu.t.1d.r.s Aall'oc:-:£at.:itlll Qr Nortll",t'll Cs.1J.£'or;n.ia 111u.st~ .. t:"'s the t::-elld. 'tOWOl1;' 
J,1\c:ll.lell.ona-.ry ICon:l.nq o:r:d1nanal;lS, e.speo1alJ.l( in e;~ifr:l]!'n:l.a I-lnere the ... is e~ten51.ve 
~ellillilt.l..on pll'ovic!l11g- 1:or a£:J!orda.l::lfl hO\lS.l.nq 1:n.ol;lnt1vElS. Se.. Cal. Gov'r: Cocie 
65580 ~~ ~.~. ~1s Qa&c re11BQ upon by thm Cit~ of McCall is Q£ 11ttl ... ss~stQn~. 
to court~ in X~aho w~e~e ener.e is not extensive legiSlative authority for 
inolus~onary zoninq c~dinaMces. 
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power to restrict tlle uses of property ill wi1:bhJ the police power of the sta.te, delegable to itll municip 
subdivisions, Imd is not per se repugnant to the CoDStltntion oftb.c United States.:' Wlule v. City atTwi 
Fer/Is, 81 r~ 175, 182.. 338 P.24 778. 781·82 (19S9). TI1er!ibL'e, the powel: to zone <lerives ffl)m th 
police power of' the sta~ Mel looaJ. legislative entities are authorized to enact 7.onmg ordinan!: 
s t"eBU'ietin,8 the uSe of property within the coIporate limits of the legislative entity. City of Ld'Wi8lCm v. 
6 
a 
lO 
12 
13 
lS 
l1 
KnSe/'ieln, 107 fdaho 80, 83. 685 P.2d 821, 1$24 (1984); see oU() Dr:rw~tm Enterprt.,cl, Int:. 'II. B/edna 
COt/fll)!, 98 Tdaho 506. St 1.567 P.2d 1251, 1262 (1977). 
The L00l1.1 Land Vile Planning Act (LLUPA). at Idaho Code Section 67-6501 tIt seq., was enacte 
in 1975. TluIldaho Supretne Court has fOl.U1d that under LLUP At "'!:be legislatm'e intended to p,lve loca.! 
goveming boards broad powers in the area of planning fllId zoning." Whilt! Y. BemnoIJ1c CfJJm 
Ca'tHmI:;,rlo"ers, 139 ldaho 396, 400, 80 P.3d 332, 336 (2003) (citing WlJl"ley Hwy. Dio5'r. v. /(oOlel'lQ 
Caunt;Y. 104 Idaho 833. 663 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1~S3». Snoh z;cni:I:Ig power 18 not 1l1'ljjn~itecl, b\1t mus 
bear a re4l8onable relation to the goals of the slate pursuant to the state's polJ.ce powers. SprMJillr. 
C11"Ubb .& .woes, I~ v. City f)f HailB)" 127 Idaho 576. 583, 903 P.2d. 741. 748 (151515) (clti.os CI1.!' (1 
l.~\!Iixh:m v. Knleriflm. 107 ldaho 80.83,685 P.2d 8.21, 824 (1984);,tee also Daw§()n E7It(Jrprisli~'1 me., 
98IdahQ at 511. 567 P.ld Sl 1262. 
The governmental power to inte1fcre by zouirlg iegulations with the genetal. rights of the 
Ia:o.d oW'l:l.Cd. by r!!Slricling the ~r of hill US!>, ill not unlimlted, and other questl.oU!1 
aslde, such restr.lctio:a cannot be imposed if it does not ,,~ a. substDltial rllllt~on to the 
. pubUc health. aaicty7 morals, Or gCilleral wellhre. 
Duwson !mf.rprtae.v, Inc.. 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 824 (citing OqlB-Callister Fira PraJer:lton PiS/. 
a3 v. Ci/1 of BO/le, 93 Jdaho 558, 468 r.2d 290 (1970) (qllotlng Nectow 11. Cily ,,/Cambridge, 277 U.S. 
183, 118 (1927»). 
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The Idaho SUpreme court bas feCognized that LLUPA i5 the e~clusfve and mandatOty source fo 
s. lntlniclPaHty~1 pla.nnizle; and toning II.w:b.orl1y, Sprenpr, GrtIhb & Maoes, Int. v, City of Haile)" 133 
Idaho 320, 321. 986 P.2d 343, 344 (1999). Under!het LLUPA. a goveming board, cI.'lnsisti118 of either 
oity col.llleil or it properly delegated planning m1d 2;Onl.n$ commission, is, give.n the pow=tS ll.lthorixed 
under the lLUPA. Idallo Coda Aml, § 67..&504. Under s~n 61-6508. the planulng ilud zan' 
oommlssion is to conduct a comprehensive plSllning process dc~igned to p~epare a. co;mp.tehen.~lve pIli 
wbich outlines the desitable goals and objectives for each pl8ll1ll.l1g compo'Oent includ.i.ng in peJ1ilmn 
part: 
k auill)'Sls of pEOviaioJls which may be necessaty to Ula1.lta that land 'Use policies, 
teS11ictloni, ccmditioXis and fees do not violate pl.i.vate property righta, adversely U31paO't 
property values CIT crute tIl1I1eceasary n:clmiCallimitntiOllS all the US~ of' property ane! 
lIDSlysis as prescribed under tbe declarations of pl.apose in chapter 80, title 61, Idaho 
Code.s 
Idaho Code AmI. § 67-6508(a).6 F'I.IIthemtore, the comprehcmsive piau aboLlld include a: proViliio 
i 
relating to housing ~OZltain.ing: I 
An aualyais of 'housing; conditions ~Q needs: 1l1am for 1mprovemlUlt of hGuamg 
stlmda.rds. a.ad plans. fell' the provision of 1!8!e. slUlitaty, ami adsq,uate bousin£t, mol\!ding 
tile 'Provision for low-cost OUn'Wlll.i.cnal ho\lSing, the sitins ofmanufacturcd h.ousing llIld 
llUIbile homes in subdivisions and parks &l:I.d on individual lots which ere .sufficlcnt to 
maintain iI. competit!.ve. market for each of those hO\lsini types and to ~s the needs of 
the ccm,munit:y. 
ldab,o Code AmI. § 67-CiS08(l).' 'The LLUPA expressly identifies the llC(;d to maintain a balBtlce 
betwecll proter.;1iag property tights and provicllDg for affordable hous.ing by !ltating thnt ont of it~ 
• Tit:.. G7, ch<lpl:er 80 of the J;c!aho c;cG\e is lmown as the tclah ... lI.Gg'lalAl:; .. Z1 'l'aJcillqs 
~~tt which e6teb~ishe5 a .l:eview proce~$ to evaluate ~GgulAto~r takings. 
~ SuQluaQ~.itm lOll on p~operty d!ihtB was adc!ed in >.995. Local Land 1:1I,e l?l:>l'Ining-
E'&ope,t¥ P.:l.9ht$-~~an.n~ng' and Zoni.ng COl\\ml$s~Qrll,;, c:b. Ul, seQ,., S 67-6508, 1995 
~dchQ ~eas. ~aw5 X.i. 212. 
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purposes 15 "[tJo protect propetty nib-til white l'Clatdng accommodations fol" other necesslU)' types 0 
development suc:b as low.cost housblg and mobile home parks." Idaho Cede Ann. § 67-6502(a). 
With respect to 2:OI1ing O~S.1hfl LLUPA provides that the govermng bo:.vci shall "establlsh 
standtris to regulaf.l! SGd restrict the height, nUDlber of' stories, size, construction, reconstruction, 
alteration. 11!pBir or use of buildIDgs and structures; percentage of lot oOCl,lpancy, si~e of coU:l~. yards, 
6 and opell. spaces; -dfilIUlity of populaticD; and the location and use of bullding$ and struotures," Idaho 
s 
9 
1Q 
11 
tl! 
16 
19 
:a 
23 
Code Ann. § 67-5511. Furthermore, the goveminS boatd may''raquke or permit as a. QODdtuon 0 
remnmg that an owner or d~veloper make a written commi1m!nt concerning the \lse 01' development I) 
the subj= parcel." Idaho Code Am. § ~70.6S11A. 
Tba indusio1\llIY :zoning ordinaaces 8l issue in tbis calie go well 'beyo.a.d thrJ tTl.ditioua! 20nin 
IIU1llc18l'ds relafulg to height, silZe, COnstruJ:tioll, zoning areas, open space requirements, density, an 
location. The City of McCall srguell it is regulating the use to wbic:b certain land or hoUliml may b~ 
by requiri.ng clevelope:ra to deed Nstric.t a pero011tmge of new dwelopment I!$ affordable or communi 
housillg. There is no dcybt that the City oiMcCall detemlined mete exists a need for aff'ordable housiu 
in McCall. Although LLUPA Bpeai.fically allows a city to inalu.de within its CWlPrebensive pI 
:resu.la.uen.~ afIec~8 property lights Mel housing eondltiODS, LLUPA does not Specifioally address 
whether the City of McCall 1;)1: all)' other city IIlll.y enaot il'lcinaionaxy zoning ordina.!lCeS. GiVeJl, tl\ 
relatively -reGent ttmd towatc1s inclusioury zoning o.«iinanc;;es sinoe LLUP A llill been enacted in Idaho, 
iL is n01 SUJprising That LLUPA does not sp;ci1ical!.y address inclU!fiona:y ~)ng ottlinano09. Thus, 
, Alllo in 19~.s. ~he t.EIIJislOl1:U:t'e inserted the lanquaqC! >:llIqa:cllll'i1 low-Clellt hCI1.le.:l.ns. 
Lgc;:el. Land esa Plann1ng-.P:roperty t<.i.ghts-Planninl7 and zonJ.Il':l Co.~:i.u:1one. oh. 181. 
sec. ~, S 67-6509, ~g95 Id~ho S$Cl8. L .. w~ H.a. 2~2. 
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wheth~ the City of McCall Jl1!J¥ req'Uire affordable bousing through a land. use regi.ilation ill B matter n 
first. l111pression which this COUrt must d;oide. 
A. Restrictil)1\J on the City of MeCaU'. Police Powers 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized three g811lXal restrictions on So munlciplllity's polic 
p()WetSl (1) the ordinance ~ust be conilned to 1M limits of the gO"QUlmental body eus.cting the $amej 
(2) such ordinan~e must 1lO~ be in colltliet with other gen.erallaws of the state; and (:3) gw:h ordi 
must not be an unreasonable or arbitra.ry enactment. Hobht v. 4brama. 104 Idaho 20S. 207, 6S7 P.2 
1073, IO'?S (1983) (citing Sl"t~ Y. Clark, 88ldaho 365, 374, 39" P.2d 955,960 (196S)). 
1. Begyltllion WMin me City LimiTI QfMcCa/l 
In Hobb&, the QOun~ passed an ordinanoe which prohibited tho sAle of beer in ko&s In "Fra.l1kl' 
CO\tnty," and also probl'bited The posseslllon of beer m kegs witlrln the ''u.Ilinco1pol.'atllld areas ofPran . 
County." 104 Idaho at 207. GS7 P.2d alt07S, The plaitttiffin that osse O\Vl'1ed. twO busirlesscs license 
1'0 sell beer in Fr&l:lklin, Idaho and Preston. Idaho. The Ideho Supreme CoW't held that the plaintiff d' 
o.ot have stalIding to chIillenge the ordinance smce ros busin£sses were Within an incorponlted ciLy and 
the CCliAty did not have the IIIUthOrity to resuls.te IICtlvities within incorporated cities. la, at 208, 657 
P.2d at 1076. Slm.ilazly, in the und=riyillg case, the City of'McCall's OrdinlUlce Nos. 819 and 820 only 
have power and e.f;tect wltbm th~ limits Qf'tbe City of McCall. Althou/ih the ordl.o.a.ncl!J repeatedly at!! 
that such ordinan"s ba.ve bean implemented in parmmhip Wilh Valley Count,)', Adams County, and th 
communities ofCa:loade. DonneDy, aDd New Meadows. Ordiruanca NOB. *19 aud 120 can m regulate 
land uSB pmnits In the City of McCall.' Tb=efore. Ordinmoe Nes. 819 snd 820 would u.ot apply to 
laudo'WnlM who owns and wishes to subcljv.lde land located outside the ~ty limits of McICall. 
2S --------------------, ?u~suant to O~inance No. Bl$, it • deVelg~er p&Qvld$s commun1ey housing off-sitQ, 
26 tne develope: is ~eqyire4 to provide ~~s 9crcent of th~ amount at l.nd wnich ~gul 
W&lMO~QK DSCr.S ION MilD CIIJ:IJlP. - E'AGm :I. 0 
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2. NOI in Cqn{hct w{fb Qtb.er Gslll.rfJll4wR q(rbe 8tme 
T,Indet'the seoond prong of HDhb,r, this Court m1.1'iit detettaine whether Ot'di.llance No:!. 819 and 
820 Bll: in conflict wlth other general laws of the state. The stated p1.U'pose of ti,ese ordinances is to 
provide a "reasonable supply of affordable, dilled restricrtcd workforce hcusmg (colllmunity hOQs!IlSt' to 
"et'lSLlre that critical professional workers, essential service 'personne~ and service workers li'Je withi 
p~ox!m1ty to theiT work to provide municipal eM private sector sarvices." In 01'1ier to obtain a bail . 
permit to subdivide land and build houses or dwel1iog UDits. a JandoW"!lal' 1'tJust desig/lllJ! CIt leest tweIl 
pmeJ).~ of the lauCi or lots &$ decd-~tricled community hau5'iog under Ordinance No. B19. 
F'urthemlorc, in older to build mlidential dwelling units, & landowner is teq'Qixecl to pAy a communi 
hOTJSing fce for a building pe.tn1it under OrdinaMe No. 820. 
Pl.U'9UlUlt to Otdinam:e No. 819. upon applying for subdivision ttpptC'Va1, a developilT mUSL IlUbmi 
an !rJelusklnalji &us!ng Plan whieh designates that at least twenty parce.tlt of all the lots MCl ht)L1ses ! 
the 81.lbdivWOll have been permanently deed-restrlc:ted9 sa conllllUIli I}' housillg and affordable to 
households in MoCall with mod.erate or middle incomes in categories In a.t1d. IV. Ordinance No. 81 
speoifically states that FOviding on-site oomm.\tI'dty housina wltb.iu. the new subdivision is the fits 
puonty. However, if a landowner or developOl' is !lot able to dmpate cottlTll,u:nty hOLlSilIg within \:he 
Pl'OjlOlied subdivision. the SecQl10 p,rior!ty ia for the developr:r to designate ooromunitr hOl1sitlg outsi 
b"vl2 been J:'1I~:I.,nd on~6ite, if tne off .. s:l.1:E! hou.sing is "withJ.n the city U1I1its or 
tbe City of ~eC:l!.ll." Al.terni!lt.L'lrely, it the Off-aHe l'Ious!.nq b lQcat:<.d "withAl) til 
alty limit!! 0: anot.h,,1i' rnunicipal..ity located ill Val,ley 0. AQsmll Ooun~Y/" tlle 
QftveJ.ppec ill lOe~lrecl to 9J:'Qvide 150 percent ool: thlll &!lIClU"'!: y:hi.cm would hOI"" beat 
1;'I!'I":l.r"d 01lo-::1te. ,;'0 the extent that thla City o~ MaCall. a.i:l~Qrnpt., 1:0 l:e9u:l.ste 
housift~ out8:1.dc lea City 1!1I11t. suoh provis1on ts wi~hout ef~eot ~na therefore null 
and void. 
v a~dinance No, 8l' al~o ~%ov~a~~ th6t a~ an ~lternattva to pe~mQnant d~Qd 
restr.i.o:.1:.1cn, the< I:!e'l"eloper 1l\l!I;II' requ$$t tnllot \lp ~o twenty-five perQQl'l.t of the lOh 
and hou$e» be s\ll:)::!sc:t to an "Equ1t}"-a'llildezo" p;:QgrliLlII-
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the s!.\bdivlsion, or "off-site." The third priorl~ 11 for a developer to r;onvey land to the City of McCall 
Fur C01lll11unit)' housing. Allci the fourth prj onlY is to pa.y a fee in lieu of communltY bousi.na. 
Essentially, the McCall City Council decides p~ to the priority list if on-site cOlnmunily housing Is 
impractical 
Under the firit twO priorities, a.. landowner still ~s o~rsbip of such cOtmrutnit)' holl5!n 
unitq but ls resCtiQted regarding 6eJling or rentilll comn1\i.\llty hcusmg l.lnits.10 l11e third and fourth 
priorltfa ate reallWVed for silUatiOllS ill whieh it is not practical for the landowner to develop cOtllmUl'li 
llQusing either on (If off she because the required cotnmUllity housing units results in less than On 
housing 'Ullit.11 Under the third 1Ill4 tQlIrth prlorlf,jes, the landowner either conveys llU1d calculated at 
Inarket value, or pays a. fee .qual to the total S'Q.osidy amcUl'lt lOt the required oommu.uity housblg Unl'ls 
Additionally. if tile number of lCquired 00l'llm'l1'l1iLy housing lll1its .result in a &actIon under the first 0 
second priority, lhe lanclQWI:lCr must pay ~ in lie'll:fee equiil to tile sub~id:v amount for that fraction. 
for any commu:aity b.ousing units proVided Ilttd~ thE! first or second priQrities. the develop 
must enter into a CUm:tnllIl\ty Housing Agl'l1leltlcnt which scts forth. among a. nllInber of oth 
reql.lireme.llts. the sales or rental terms and the l'llstrictlons to ensure ~h.e pemJlllent Ilffordability end 
l:ompUauco with the Community Housing Guidelizl.es. The McCall Planning &:. Zolling Commission lItIQ 
the City COUILOll have the power to review and approve the InclusiolUUl' Housing Plan.. If the Ci 
Council collects in lieu. fasa -pllrs'Illllnt to the fourth priority, Or fees for any fractilltlal amount 0 
oommunity hous:lng, sUch funds are to be deposited into the COlnTlluntt)' I-Iol.1$ing Trust Account to b 
10 ~Dtent1al hu~~z 0: r6n~c=~ must =eet the requi~~msnts e$tabl~shed bv the C1t~ ot 
blccall. to t;11fl11!y Eo= olIf£.,rdabllil hou61l'1g. 
.. Because ttle clevelope.r is rGII;[i1i;J::e~ 1:;0 el!;1; i1sid.a twenty pel:"cent of th2 \~n.i.t:a aE 
community houa1nQ, the m~n!m~~ numba: of un1~a a ~evelope~ must ~evelop unae: thQ 
first or 'eggnd pr~Q~1t~es would ~e ~1V& un~ts, of wh1cr. cne ~nit mU$~ be communit 
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spent for plamdng'. sllbaidlzing, Ol' deVeloping l;ommUllity hOUlJing Ullits io. McCan. A landowner may 
petition for a ref\mc1 of tho in lieu fe~ if such fees have not boc.o. e;,:pended by !:he City of McCall within 
five yea:s. provided 'the City has not already ear.r:Ilarked the fimds and extended the tim!; period iUlOth 
:flveyelm. 
FurthennOl'o, the City of McCall may a<ijust or waive th~ requlrerue.o.t.') under Ordinancc No. R 19 
if the develo'Per demon.stnltos and the City Council fUlds tncre is "no reasonabJ£: relationship b~en th I 
housing itnplu;t at the propOJe<1 .residential. subdivil!iOll and the requlre:menta of this section." City 0 
McCall OrdlMnce NQ, $19. § 9.7.10(A.)(l3)(a), Tho developer has the'burden of provIding eool,omi 
mtotl'nB.tiol'l or data necessacy to establish. that there is 00 teaSOllBPlc relationship. 
O.rdinlll1te No. 820 requires that every taDdowner seekiL1g a 'blJildiug permit Ibr a residential 
dwelling unit, Dot oxempteci by the ordin8.lllle, l~ i$ required. to pay a o~,.'11ll1\U11ty Musing fee. Thls fe: 
represents the Bubsidy Illnount requited to develop and oonstru&t c:omrnUl1ity llol.l.5io8 for fi tly perce.tl1 0 
the employees :needed to maintain and SQMcc the dwellmg umt and who have low to moderate .incomes 
in catego;ries I and 11. Suoh fees are also dsposi1:ed In the Community Housing Tnlllt AccoutLt and 
similarly to Ordma.noe No. 819, s.1m1dow.t:le:L' may request a retUnd of such fees if they bave noL beClll 
l\ol1!1l,ng. Subdivil1!i"ne with leas tb,,1\ five units l)f:eraullll.oly would. be subj$ct to 
e~ther the tni~Q ~r feurth pr\ar1ttes. 
I~ '1')1" fQllowinlJ :o:"s:i.d.e'"ltial devq,lopment un11:s are eXI!l%1l,Ptllld froIl', ;:be eClI1lIIunity 
housing :fall; 
1. The ~edQvelopment, %amcdelin~, or relocation a~ a legally pre-&~1~tinq 
~esident~al unit prOVided nc ~ew a~ a~dittonal ~B$ldential unit is creaCeQ. 
2. wha expanSiOn up to five h~nd="d square reet of grass floo. area at s legall 
pr.e-IIHt8tinQ re4idential dwellt~g u~it. 
a. !<fQb11e h .. mes, 
4. Slc:l,ll<lci, nur,s.i.nq hc.i.lit1es. 
~, )etir.~Qnt O~ aa.'~te~ liv~ng ~omQ$. 
o. roste= and g~oup ncmes. 
7. Community ~ou~1ng Qn1te, 
Se~ CL~~ of Mocall ~d1naftQQ No. Baa. G 3.8.21tC). 
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spent within :live years unless the City has ~ed su.ch :funds aild extended the time an addltloual 
live years, An applioant may also apply for lI. rec1uction or waiver oftne commUllity hO'l,l6ing r. if sueh 
pel'S on receives mcome within the Income Categories identified above or believes the .esidential \!IU 
does notrels.teto the pUlpQS!.'! and standm:ds ofOrdinan!;c No. 820. 
Plaintiff argues th Ilt Ortlinance Nos. 819 BIlQ, 820 exceed the City's zonln2 av.thorlty because Ch 
nttempt to regulate ownership a.s opposed to ll:9fl Cf'thepIO,ptlty. 'Ftrrthetm¢re, Plal.n.tifrargues that sue 
ordinancecs vIolate the genem1la.w5 Clf the state beClWse regulations relar.1.n~ to C01TI.lllUl1ity hOusing hav 
been preempted by other 8tat~ Ir-w, that such ordinances unoonstitutionally control rent, that sLlch 
ordil'WlQeS lire disguised impact fee!, or thr.t they impose illegal ttl<tc!. 
n. Whst/,n the AllIllDrlfJI to Impiemrlnt AlJordabls Housinglrus b6en ImpHedl)J Pl'Ilflmpted by Stl1.~ 
Law , 
While Article 12, Section 2 of lhe idaho COtliJ.ituiion ill & gnnt of local police powers to Idaho 
cities. this police power is limited in at least two important fCllPC:cts. First. cities cmwot act in an 
which il 1i0 completely covered by generellaw iI$ \10 indicate that it Is iii. matter of state concern. Seeond, 
cities mllY nett act 111 an !I1'e& whete to do so wo~ud conflict wlth.lhe 8t.!l.te's ge1lerellaws. Ct/emr v. Slate, 
101 Idaho 158. 161, 61 0 P.:2/1517. S20 (1980). Unde.r tb.a doctrine of in:lpl1lld. prccwption, where as~te 
has acted In an lIlCa in. .auel1 a. pervasive manne.r. it is lI$l;umed that the state int=ded to oocupy the enure 
field cf regulation dospite the lack ot: any specific langLlage preempting regulation by local govemme.n 
entities. ld. (citmg Ulf£t~d Tcn'errn Owntlr$ of PhiI~deJphia v. School /)IsI, of PhiiadelphlQ, 272 A.2 
868.870 (PI!.. 1971}). 
In 1967. the Tliallo Les;ill1a.tuxe enacted the lIouslng A\\tborlties !IUd COopc1."a.tiOll Law at Idaho 
Code Sel:tioll. 50-1901 et ssg. By ena.:;tillg tlUII 8tatu~e. the Legislature recojpli2ed the !'leed for sani 
aud safe dwelling accommodations for persons of low income. See Idaho Code AI'1IL. § 50-1S102(a). 
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EssentIally. a housil:1g authority is created as an independent public body cotporate Rltd po!itic by 
resolution of the govewiag body of the city, bl,lt D not an agency of the city. Idaho Code Aml.. § S 
15)05; see fJ1so IcW10 Code Ann. § 31·4205 (county housing authorities).13 The hotming authorit;y ;s 
inlbued with a nwuber of pO'Wel.'S necessaxy or conveuient to cau:y out and .£tec:tuate the: purposes 
provisions of the act. Specifically, a. housing authority ha:; the power to contraOl with other hGusiJ1 
mu:b.o.dties for services, ueate bylaws, .n.tlll& Blld regulations, prepare. can)' out, aeqtJire. lease, 
operate ho\'lSing l)tOjeots, lease or rent dwellings. esta.blis\, and revise rents, own, holel and illlprove re 
or llt:SolUll property, WlC acquire real p;roperty through eminent domain. Ida.ho Cod.e A.rul. § So-J 904(&). 
(b), and (el). 
Overall, Chapter 19, Title 50 of the Housing Authorities and Cooperation Law diSC\1Sse5 II 
housing authority'S ability to own and aC!\uira real. property. Subsection (d) granti the housing au'lhorit 
broad power with respect to leasing, l'etLting, oWDlng, purcluLsing. aoqmril1g by gift, gmI\t, bequest, 
~ev!se, or eminent domain, and sel.!in.g, exchanging, transfening, assigning, pled:!\lng or disposing ofany 
real orpersonal property. Idaho Code Arm. § SO·1904(d). This is Quite di:fD:lent from any "interest" th 
City of McCall may bave in a landcwner'!J real property which is requl..J:ed to hI! eurmmked. 
eommumtyhousing 1.IIlderthe:first two priorities ofOtdlrum.oe No. 81~. 
This Court believes that the Ir:lilha LegislatUre has carefT.111y destgnated PI,-vVers withln a ltous 
a\lthorlty in Cb.aptcir 19, Title so and Cbs.pter42. Title 31, of the Idaho Code (created eithcrb;yaclty Or 
CO':Ulty) to a.ddress housing prol,lllilmil anc! provide for affordable hollSi.ng to low Income hOI:l~olds. 
Pursuant to those code sections, a housilla au.thorlty may aequire real propetf:y prlmarlly tiu'ol.lgh two 
meah.aniS1llSJ the power of emiruml: domain and the issuance of bonds upon proper resolutfon. Idaho 
u Cba,pt:er 19, 'l'itl.e !SO o£ 1:1\ .. :rcraho Coc!e .. h.i.ch. '1" .... l:n!I !!1.j;.!{ h~\,le.l.nq il,,'O'l1cllrh"lIe LIt 
GlIunt.!.all.y ;'QlllnUcal 1:.0 ct\lI.ptl!\l: 42, 'l'Hl.e ;U gove:l::ling coun1:y bou$!.n9 aUt.horitj es. 
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Code Amt. §§ SO"1914, .1916; 31-4214.0.4216, With mlch bonds, e. housing ll.utbol'h:y may pmCb.!Se 0 
obtain rsal prapeny.H 1\ hous.il::li authority may also ~qL1ire real property by gift. grant, bequest 0 
devise. Alternatively, iii. housing authority may also acquire real property through loans. Idl.iho Code 
Ana. §§ SO.1904(i)j 31-4204(i}. ~rthenno.re, a city Or county may lend. 01' donate money to thll housil'l., 
1llXI:b:0.tity. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 50-1909; 31-4209. And tlm fCderal government may alao loan, 
~Qntrib\L1e or provide grantQ or othc=r f11lancial assista,noe to .ho\'!Sing authorities. Idaho CCH!e Ann. §§ SO 
1923; 31-4223. 
It II city or county finds that thm iOOst ''iDsanitarr or UllSaN" dwelling accolmtlodations or th 
tbere is a. shortage of safe lUld _tmy dwelling accom..tnOdations a:vailable to low ittoome h.ousehol~. 
"(tJbe sO'Verning body shalJ adopt a resolution declaring that the..-e i:; ; neC(i for a housing !l.Utll0rity." 
ldallo Code AM. §§ 50-190S; 31-4205. A1tho~ a city Or coun1y is :not required to create a hou.sin 
a\lthority, it seems appare:nt that lfthe city or county is faced with a need to address affordable llous~, 
the appropriate mechanism fb: m0Viimling affCl'dable botlSi.ag ill through a no'Usil'lg authority PIJ.l'lluant to 
either liBctlon 50-1901 IJt Stq., or !!ectl.oll 91-4201 el .ieg.IS Essentially, these stfltUtes provid~ the 
iramewotk in whiclllocal government. are to address lIff'ordahle housing. 
~( :tt low il'\t:.QlIIc I\ol.lsinq is ownact by a nOI'l-p:.:ot;Lt Qr'la;g.~2atj,Otl such i!.:il a housin/J 
authority, iU would be el1gihl& to De ese~t £~om t&K~~ion un~er Idaho Co~ Section 
63-602GGl. The Idaho 1mpa.c\: Il'ee Ae't, I~aho Code SIlIClt10n \i7-S201 e!: seq., alISO 
a"ntain.ll en inc.entive fo;r: af.!!orclabJ.e houSin9'- Looal gove.l::'11Ie:1':.11 may lVaive all 0% 
part o£ any impact fees as an incenl;ive for c!lIv",lopeze to inc:lucle a£fo'l:dabl 
how;.l.l'Ul' :roano Code !J 67-9204(10). . 
u By R\;\" .. ,1.utol.g,n lO-O!!, Valley County and. Adem!: county o:r:eated iI county !lQudn 
lIut.hQ~:!.t.y 'knoMl .t\1II VAru'lA pu.stumt to Idaho eodQ s,,"tion ~1-4:<!Oa. Undo=" the 
s4¢~ion, II. ;>al1n:l:y may aut.ll.o:r:1:c:e t:l1e c:ual::ion o£ a hOUIiI.l.fl(l ilIuthcdty, ..-ith tlle 
al:>;!,,l.l!:y to t:r:aIU'Il.ct bl:ll.liness And e:Ka:r:ci:lo powers, pur!!l:Ian~ to a prOper rellolut.io 
deoh:in9 1;1'\& n&ect far an author.l.ty 1;0 function. aesol.ul;ion 10-06 WDS Acop~.ci " 
JanllUy 23, 2006, $.i.9nec1 by the Valley county COlMlissionors. WhUIlt the C!.ty (I 
McCall d1~ not exp~esBly al1tnori2Q a =~t.y ho~s!n9 al1thcr.l.t~, it appears to rely on 
the ti~dlngs and QKpe:eLee or. VA~HA. ~;r;.l.o~ to tbo e~&ation De VARMA. t~e City o~ 
McCaU p"lIIud Rcasolu1<ton 05-3,9 proV'1dlng for II Cahnun!ty !>ous1nq poliCY "Ihioh 1I00S 
:li~ed by Hayor ~i~X ~. 6imere ~n SeptGmber Z2, 2005. o~d1nanQ. NOB. B19 and a"o 
~ii\1Iml~ ])EC;rS:rCN AN!) 0lUlD. .. PAG:& 1.6 
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1 
In 1m, the Idaho LegislatlrCe enadeci Idaho Cede Section 67-tSlO 1 fill seq" which created. a state 
agenC1, the ldaho Housing and Fin8noe AuOciiti(lD, to address the issue of .£fordable hotlSlng. 
Esliemially, the state hO\lslns assooiation 1s empowered to OOnd~lc.t it; business, make anci el(eeute 
4 aue=ents or oonQ·~ta, and to le8l!l'I, sliIll. construct, finanoe, aIlyllousing projects an to estl!.l,lllsh an 
s revise rel1ts or t:!haJ:ges. Idaho Code AnD... § 67-6206(a), (b), (e), and C£). The stato 110\JS' !U!sooia.l.ion i 
, 
s 
.i.O 
lG 
17 
lG 
u 
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also em,powerecl to own. hold end. Improve rea! property. purcbese, lease, and obtai options UPOll. 
acqala by ~£t. grant,. bequest. devtse. eminent dDm!tin or otherwise IlllY real property to sell, lellSe, 
e~chaIlse. traneter, BSslgrl, pledge. or di$po&c of such propel;'f:y, Idaho Code Atm.. § 7-6206(g), (11). 
Housing projeat$ are to be subject to the loc;:a.l pb.lllIling, zoning, $aJ1itary aud bui1dl.c.g la.ws. ord.i.Mnce 
ancI te~ationa applicah.le to the locality oflh.e ho1l$ins ptojcct&. Idaho Code Ann. § 6~-6109. SimUe: 
to housing authorities, ll"Ie state MUSing usoolatioll has the: power of eminent dolllflin ~d the power to 
issue bonds to aelriove its puxpose o:t'providing affordable hOlisillS. Idaho Code Ann. § +-6205. 
The Legislature ha5 also I:eateci the Idaho Housing Trust Fund fOr the putpos~ of providing 
"continuously NllBwable resource known 3j iI. bous!ng trust fu:od from the private andlJ public ltIoney 
I 
to ;usift low-income and v~ low-income citi2ens in Jl1.eetiag thelc basic housing nee II, and that th 
needs of very Iow-illcome citi.=ns shcntld be given priority." Idaho Code Atm. § 67-810 . TIle housi 
trLlSt funds are to be used to !!S8ist II. varl~ of aeti'llities. iJ:Iclud\ni b~111.ot limited to: 
(a) New construction, rehabilitatIon, or acqulJitl on of hctlSing units IOl' ace 
fnOOl"l1e and vel:)' low-Income houadlolds: 
(b) Rent aubsidiea in new construction or re'lulbilitatcd. multifamily "Units for I 'W·!ncome an 
~~ low~.iaconlC bouseliolds. \ 
I 
24 
raly on COIll%\!IlJ'lJ.ty Gu1d.elJones anaot:.e.d .by VAlUU\. ;lind. to tho ext.ent. r.hl!li:.l~h .. City Q
1
l.· 
Nc:CaJ.J.'" Il.e .. "l\lti .. ~ "1.1o,,,sCl l:hQ Oity of HOea).l to Iltnl.lct ~~Ql'U .. J.onny ~cJ"ls.n 
Qtdinan~.s, thQ ada!n~s~~ab~9n Q~ eu~b or~inan=e~ is 9Qve:ned by VARKA. I 
I 
~CK J)!lCISION MUl oaDEa - E'AGD 1" I 
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(e) Adminial:nl.tLvc costs for houshl.a 8S1Ii.sta.nce groups or orgBrlizations which pro;,lde housini 
when fUM gr&t\t Or lOan will 8ubstanuall)' l.ncrease tbe r=ipient's B.Qae8S to housing funds 
o~er thsn. those avaUable '\ll'lIier this chapter; 
(i) Acq,uilitioll of housing 'UnitS for t1.e pUl-pose of pre8e.t'VaUon as housillg f'OT J.cw-UIcome an 
ve.t:y low-iacome households; 
Idaho Cod.e AmI. § 67·8103 (2). Local governments and. local how;ing lI.lliliotitles Dlay receive I1Bsistanl:e 
from the stare housing IISsoeia.1ion. Idaho Code Ann. § 67 .. 8104. Specifically, the Iclaha Housing T 
& 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
28 
Fund Act applies to loW and very low illllome hcuseholdl.i1 iiUld defines low-J.neo[tle households as those 
wi~h a median i.t:t.come of more tb.an fii't)' percent but lesa than eighty peroent of the mediftll income of the 
a-rea. and vezy-low income h01llle\lolda asc those with less tl:uu~ :My percent of the medhm income. Idaho 
CodeAcl:L § 67·8102(9), (10). 
The Plaintiff argues the Legislature S1lec{fically chose to addles, affOl-dmble housing in separa. 
and. distinct statutes. The lItatut~s cited flbova do not make it au. absolute reqlliIement to build affordable 
bowing. Rather. the Plaintiff argues such statutes limit a looal government' $ nb.ility to provid 
affordable !lousing tnIOup bonds or Imlinent domain or to otIer hlcellti.ves suoh as tax or impact fee 
e:x.ernptions to davela.l'~rs. The City ofMcrCI\.II, on the ot.h$r hand, argul!l$ !:bat nOlle of the Qbove statutes 
prohibit the City from pasSi:ag legi$lation to provide .for .hOUsing thJl.i 15 affordable to the City'S 
wor.kforce. Wlult th= lI.bove statutes 111m olear is that t1w Legish~1;gIC has ena~d provisions bal 
thl'oU/?Jl the Idaho Housing 8JJ.ci Firlance Association as well as local housing authorities at the city l11ld 
eoUJ.lty level to ~ affordable hoU3ln.g. 
liowevl'l'. 'the Idsb.o Suprcm.e Collrt has held tbs.t "[aJ local QTOioance which merely go 
I 
further than Ii stnte statute in impostnS additional tegwtlt!on of 1\ given. c;;onduot does nut conflict with 
state law." Yoyle, v. City of Namp4. 97 Idaho 597.601,548 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1976). FutthcmlOlC, 
under LLUPA, :'[wlhe.c.wer the ordi:Q~~s made under this chapter ImposB hisher I1Itanda.rc'ls tbaa. at 
RESPONDENT/CROss-ApPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1332095_34,10915-9 
Page 70 
1. 
2; 
:'l 
4 
5 
G 
-; 
I! 
., 
10 
U 
'2 
13 
14 
1!l 
l' 
19 
:1.1 
111 
... _ by "" C>tbor .L '" Ioool ri,,,,,,,, ... JXOVisions of _. nadc _ lI> cbl 
ebapter ahaU gO'Vem." 1 
reaardini comtD.unity or 
legislature Impliedly p . 
provia!: the framoworI( 
Under Ordin 
da'Velop1ll1' is r~w;ed to 
speolfioati011!, sales an 
pe.xmanent aL'fotd.ability 
o Code: Ann. § 67-6518. Although there is exteD8ive Stil.tutory regulation 
Ol"dablc housIng fOT lew income households, this Court does .I1ot find t/lat th 
p~d the entire field. of affotdable housing. While sucllJesislatloJ:l. me; 
-regulations relating to affordable housing. there is uothing in these statutes 
~ity :from enacting a zonmg ordinan;!: with respect to affordable hOl.lsl1\g. 
No. 819, if a developer cOllll1ructs commw::U.ty housing ull1ts as rentals. th 
1I.W1" Into Il C07;lwunity lfo1.18mg Agreement which provides the COllstructiO 
r rental teans, and the restrictions placed on the units to ensure thei 
compliance wIth tbe CO!l1Tll1.lllitlr Housing Guidelines. Such housing is 
pen:nanently deed-restrl d affordable housing subject to the regulations governing potcntial rente:ra 
wi.tb. q~ inconle ItOl$' V ARHA reco1l1lllClIUis .re.ntal or sale priCI:I~ to the City of McCall, 
although. the City has the ultimate IlUtbority on price Or T~ restrlctiollfil. Such deed res!rict;ollS flI1 
afftu'dable houswg classifi tion remain t'ilild to the property alld 1'11.0. with tile land to fu.tu.te owners. The 
Ci1¥ 01' MoCall argues it lSta.ms an i:ntorest in the deed-reatnC"ted community hOl.l&lllg through the 
community houling agree ent entered into by the property ownerS and thtougb the tegr.Uations whioh 
Plailltlf[ arguas that such r nt reauictlo.l1S Amount to II violation ofldal1o Code S()c:tion 55·307(2). 
Idaho Code Seetio 55·307 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A local govermnen: unit shall not enact. maintain, or enf'Orce an ordlnanco or 1'esolution 
that would have th effect of controlling the aznount of rent chuied. for lelllol3ing private 
residCl"ual propertyl 'l"hia provision does not impgir lhq dgTrf otanv legal governmelltal 
ynlt to (f.ffVia,ge and ggnJrqi mtdllKt(aZl?tD!JerlV II! wIdell !he lqcaZ gov!lr'nmqatW1dniJ har 
G P1'QPtV'1V tntufl~.t·l 
HmIOlIANDOH D2C:CS:ot NOD OI'J)EiI. - pAGJi 19 
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1 Idaho Code Ann. § 55-307(2) (cmplwis added). 'rhe stat.ute expresslY allows a loea! govemmental uru 
to enact s.. rcsoll.l1ioJl that would have the effeet of controlling rent if !.be governmental ~Lt has 
"propeny mterest" in the. .residential property. The City argues it has an. interest in SUCll affilrda.b[;: 
housing, explaining that its interest, while Itot a pOS!essoty interest, is II. regulatoty CII:Id adrninislnativ 
iutereSt "applied through V AR.HA, to maintain. the tlPkeep end usdUJ.nsss of SlJ.ch Ilffordable l:1ou5i.n 
~ 
7 uml3 and to I!l1l1UlO tbillt such u:oits are utilized only by thoBe individuals qualitYlng fOr the low income 
e homing," 
10 
l~ 
12 
13 
Under Idaho Code S~tion SO-1904, aeity housing authority hIlS the power to r<l .. iIS~ arrent an 
ciWellings • • . embraced in any h01.'lSing .project .•. [andl to establish and revise ~ renla or charges 
1h.erefQre.!~ Idaho Code Ann. § 50 .. 1904(d); !'ee aLso tasbe Code Ann. § 31·4104(d) (county haus' 
authntlty). 'Furthermore, these provlsiorul provi<k a bOlll!;ng authority with the power to acquire Sllch 
teal property thr~h c:minel)t dommn or with :funds obtained throuih is.su8l1ce of II. bond. Sell Idaho 
15 Coda Ann. §§ 50-1914. -H.l16; 31-4214, -421G. A housing authority would olearly have a "prop 
H interest" in such property and the aut]lorlty £0 control r¢llfS. See Idaho Code A.nc.. §§ 50-1$'1:) end 31. 
l' 4213.. This Court. does nQt conclude that the City of McCall possesses the same interest as a housLn 
1 a al.Tthority Which owns real pl'op~. 
2Q 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The CIty of McCall admits it lias only a. regulatory or adminlS1nJ.ti.ve interest. This CO'Ilrt i3 no 
(:ol1.vlncel! that such intere:rt attlO1.U1ts to Q "property i~est" under section 55-307(2). The landowner or 
cl.eveloper of afForda.ble lwusing would retain a property interest lIubject to regulation. To hold tbat 
local iovemrnont entity has III p%Qpozty Inn::rest in:teal property when it exercises only B regulatory 0 
admInistrative f'LIllcTJ.on WQuid e:;se.ntiIll.Uy eviscerate Idal10 Code Seotion 5:5-307, which prohibits a 10l:a.\ 
goverllDlent from cOl1trolling rent ClllU'gc4 for leasing private :re:dde.ntial. prOperty. 
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Co WAd/I8/" the Onlinances &lIct lin Ururlltllorl:ed T/r% Dr Me Dfseuued Impact Fs.u 
Initially II. dIstinction m.ust be dta.WIl with respect to Ol'dblanoe No!. 819 and 820. 
ordillanc=s II%e essentially aJ.tempting 10 JZ!IlJ!i!J! for aff'OTdable h01l8ing rathel than ~ affordable 
housing. Altb.ousn the Court deters to the City 'ot McCall's findings relating tu the Il.eed for atfordabl 
housing IUld. t'he Cil!y'e sincere effortS 10 provide for such, this COlll't is bc:ms asked to deCide 
eonstitu.tionaLity of the means f.ile Clty of McCall is Iltilizing to provide fClt' flifordable })ouslng. Tho CI 
ofMcCa1l hi.lS ll:I.etieu1ously engineered Q land we provlsio.ll. 'Which requires tandoWDers and d~l()p 
to give O'VCr $l)1Ucetbing of value in exelum.ge for the right to develop a stllldivisiO'l;! or build. a reidden . 
Ullit.. Whil,the Ci1y of McCall e:rguIlS tllat Ordinance Nos. BIg and. 820 merely regulate the growth 0 
resIdential housfug in McCall, it is undeniable that the _rut goals of such orcUnances lite to provide fo 
"a reasonable supply of affQrdable, deed reWfctsd workfolCc housing (cOlIlmumty housing)." Such 
ordinances oontemplate that in exMlUlie for approval and lssua.ncc of a. b1ll1ding permit a.land.ovmer 
develtlpe.t' must give over something of valulJ, whether it be an agreetnent to provide deed~ mtricte 
inc!usiollilZ)' housJng, the conveyance efland. or a fee \Illder Ordinance No!. 819 or 820. Thererore, this 
Courtmu!t detemLi11c whether the City of McCall has authority for exacting such "fee. ,,16 
14 When the Cou.rt UBiIUi the tom ":fee" .U ill r"~errin9 to allY and. aU ot th~ 
priodt1elil listed unde!r' Crd.:l.l'lancs No. 819, and. ngt mer$ly 10he "in lleu fee" I,ll\der 
tho fourth prio):ity_ .E'u.rche::m.Ol:B, it i& unc!.erstcod that utlde. Ordinance NO. I!~O. 
the cOI1IIIIun.:l.l:.l! !'Icu,s1n!i to is a "fea'" in IIny general tIIInslI:! of the WOT-d. The Court' II 
analys:l.s .:1.8 not :rel5tr.:l.cted to 'the fllot tl'l&t unt;le:", the firllt two priod'til!5 0 
oy,Cl,inanoe No. 819, the landow.Qe:: ill lIlot :T:e:t..l.n.qu.:l.:ehing' oontrol over his OJ:' her 
prope:~y. ~hi~ doe~ not m$lIn thAt the 1.n~owner {s nc~ in e~senQe pay1n9 a pr~ee 0= 
II "Cee" to the City of Mct:aJ.l .f!o%' the pdVj,le9'~ of $~clivic:lin9' or erect11'1g 
i11lprovel'Jlents Oll his or ne;:: land. This Court :reC:"!1llizu the {a.ct tMt:: the Cjty 0 
McCaU hIllS eh",r~oe.eri:l;.d. .IIuch .!:'aqu.!.rOll.\ent &8 a "eIJ.b8i<i,y amount," as deJ.'inl!d by the 
?~avisionl! fez; land con_yenee iill1d the in USl.'l tee. Sail C£!;y of "" .. 01141 Ord1.nanct! 
No. 019, 6 1iI,7,lOIAj(4){e) lind § 9.7.10(1'1.) (5)(b). !the):'efore, it:: i.~ appropr.1ete for 
':his COUl:'t 1:.. find that the ~equ;!.=er:"mt41 under. ;my or t.he £0= pld.o:hJ.BII 1-
o;rclinancta No. S:l.S constitute 1Il "£ee.'" 
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M\Ulicipalities In Il.Uowea pursuant to the Idaho Co tutiDn to ensct fees Dr impose taxes '10 
1 
the public or on paxtioula:r persons: (1) by legislative en ~ wbich speei~alJ.y permits til 
municipality to fund. a p~ject through tb.!C assessmlmt ot tax s or fees; ot' (2) p1Xt$Wll1t to the polic 
= power for the collection of revenue: inoidf:ntlll to the en.fi :t of a regulation. Sec idaho BUil 
Cot/ftacloTO Ass 'n \I. Cily of Coeur J) ~lBns. 126 Idaho 740, 74 -43, 890 .P.2d 326, 3l8·29 (1995). 
'7 
Article 7, :l8ctitm 6 of the Idaho Co:ast1tutfon expr6S$ provides tnat a city has the power 
a 
assess IUld collect UlXos for all purposes of the citY OQ!pOra.tiO!l 
10 
7 • .sec(ion 6 of the Idaho Conatitulion permits II. m,1.llliclpel co ntiOI1 to I1Ssess and collect taxes for th 
11. PI.I1.'pOSIIS oftlle corporation, that taxing authorltyis not sel:f.ex eutiug and is limited to that tIiXin& '(lowe 
12 given. to 1be municipality by tho Idaho Legislature. Ii. at 742. 90 P .2-d at 32& (oiting BrewSftl' v. Ci1Jl 0 
U Pocatello, lIS ldabo 50l. 503-04. 76B 1'.211 765, 756-67 1998». :Neither party has asserted any 
statutoIjl authorIty Whiob would pennit the City ofMcCsll to mpose 9. tax through Ordinance Nos. 1119 
)~ 
anel 820, ln fact. tile City Qf Mccall denies that the fees or costs imposed upon lauaoWl:l.el's in either 
16 
Ordtaance Nos. 819 or 820 constitute 4 tax. Ratl)er, the City U$~ such fees ere 1s.'I.Vful pllt'5UlU1t to its 
1; 
19 Under Article 12, section 2 of the Idaho Constimti a muni~ipality may enact reg\llation 
20 Illll'$Uant to i1S police power far the furtherance of the pub e 'health. safety, morals, or welfare of i 
22 
1I3 
residenTs. Idaho Canst. Art. 7 § 6. Pumtant to those police owers.!l. lllunieipnlity may provide for the 
collection of revenue incidental to the ClDfo(t;;eIDent of a tcgul tiOIl. Jdaho Bldg. Contractors A.a8 'n, 12 
Idaho at 74~..43J 890 F.ld at 328·29. However, IlUCh. municip fees 111USt bc rationa!1y related to the cos 
of e.cfon..'illg the reauIation and. cannot be assessed purely as a. revenu.e-getllInlting sclum'l.e. Br8wst~r v. 
City of !'()t!I'.I.UJlc. l1S Idaho 502. S04, 708 P.2d. 76S. 76 (1988). If the £ee or c:illll'jtc is il'l'lposeQ 
2II1ZMol1lUJ)UM Dl!lC:!:S:tON AND 01iU)U - :eAGS 22 
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primarily for xevel'\ue raising .PU1:posts, it l$ in ~Ience , tall; 1ItJ,Q. Q'8ll only be upheld unde,r 1he power 0 
laxation. rrhlv:J Bldg.. CQflII'4ClO1'S us '12, 126 ltiIWl at 743,890 P.2d lot 329. 
The City ofMoCall argues ~b.at Ordinance Nos. 819 and gJO are not revenue raising meeblll'ltllJllS 
bLlt rather 121\0 1.1Ie lesu1ati~.ns ~ted through the City's J1f11iee powers to control 2otdc.g regulation 
within the City's jl.lrisdiction because Buch ordinances control a specific Ulje of land I!ll.d developme 
Just as the City of Coeur 1)' Alene Elrgued ill idaho Butldln.g COlllraclars ANsociatlr:m. the City ofMoCa 
argUQ tbBt Oldinallce Nos. 819 a.nCl &20 have bean ~ted for the purposes of ~0lX10tittg the heel 
v.relfltt'e, safety. aud morals of the residents of McCall. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors ks 'II. 126 Idaha a 
743.890 P.2e1 at 329, 
In Brewster, the ldah.o Supreme Catm stldressed. the validity of IU1 Qrdmance passed by the "it 
of 'Pocatello abarging a 5treet restOraf;\oll and maintenance fee upon all OVJXletS 01" OCCtLprulU of prop 
in the City of Pocatello pursuant to II. fonnula. re±1.ect!ng the: traffic which was estlma.ted \0 be generated 
by that particular property. ld. at 50.2, 768 P .2d at 765. The Court beld that "the: revenue to be collec 
from PocliteJlo IS meet fee hu no )lecessary rell1tionthip to the reg.ulll.'tion of travel over irs streetS. bul 
rather i~ to ie~ funds tor the non-regulatory f\.!nc1iQD of repairIng; QllI.'t maintaining meets, Th 
maintenance and repair of streets is 11 nod-regula.tOry fimctiOll 8Ii the temus apply to the 1'acts of th 
ill$tam csse," [do at 504. 768 P.2d at 761. The fcc: imposed by tM otdlnanco in BrtfW81fJr effectively was 
a general tax. ratbet than an i 1'l.c.idental reg\uato1'Y fee. '1n. iii. l1,eneral sense II. fee is II charge 3Qt a dIre 
public s~rvl~ rendered to the partioullU' consumer, whil$ a WI is 11 forceQ contribution by the public 
IDl'ge to meet public Deeds." ld at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. 
Under Ordinance No. 819, tb.e sl1bsitiy c.rel!l.'ted ei'tlwr by requiring land.o'WMll to deed rl1B1ric;t a 
pl:!r.l;elltu.ge of Ullits as COll'l'lUUllity howing. to eOl1\1e'y laud, or to pay an in lieu fee appe8l.'S to be 8l'l 
h')novlllive wuy of creating at" generating atrord&ble housing, Quit" plainly. wet! the fees col1ected 
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p\1rmant to OrdiJ:lanl:t No. 820 ere for th.e purpose of "planning. subsidi~ing, developUJa or COllstru4lti 
~l')mnl\lnilY housing." City of McCIll1 Ordmance No. 820. § :U.21(E)(4). To be: a valid fee, the 
must be incidental to the GnfOlcetuent of the regulutloll lIlld bear II -reasOl'Ulble relationship to the cost 
tmfoJ:cing such le~ulation. Brl!'W$lBl', 11 S Idaho lit 504, 768 P'.2d at 767; fie also It'Oftsr '8 Inc. Y. Bah; 
Cil)l. 63 Tdab.o 201,118 P.2.d 121 (lSl41). 
The City of MaCall Brg1.les it has specific Sl1MoIy l1"L1fhodty UD.der the tLtIP A to require 
subsidy under 0rdinatI.ce No. 819, or II fee under Ordinance 'No. 8l0, to provide for aafe, affcrdab\ 
housmg. Generally spcakitl,g, the LLUP A. goveXl1& ionlng regulations sw:h 38 setbacks. density, an 
height fegulatIona. Ss, SpreTlgsl', Grubb &0 .4.830C8. \I. Ctl')1 of Hailey. 127 Idaho 576.903 P.2d 741 
(199S). However. as dlscussed previously. the LLUPA does not pl"OvidfI the City with any authority fo 
eMCting ordi.D.a.l:lces wnich. require tbat developer" provide aifordable bousing, let alont! authority to 
impose a fee or require a. sWlsldy from lSlldowll,m to futlhcr suoh goals. To tiw contrary. LLUPA 
provides ~"C 
Feu establ18h;d for purposes of lult.iga.t.ing the financial .Impacts of developtllent must 
comply with the provisions of chapter 82, title 57. lda.ho Code. Deoial of Ii lIubdivision 
pWJ%lit or approval of a subdivision permit 'With cond.itiotls unaceeptable to the land()'WXler 
tnay be subject to the tegulatory taltinS analysis provided fo1' 'by .ectlon 67-8003, Idal,o 
Code,. consisteDtwlth 'the requirements c.stabllshed thereby. 
ldeho Code Aml. § 67.6513, Chapter 82 iB the Idaho Development Impact 'Fee Act,17 and provides fo 
the impositiDn by ordiuance of deve10pJnent lmpa.ct fees IlS a couclirion of c:Ievelopm.ent approval. Idaho 
11 'the J;cll!.hc Cevelopment: ll!lpacl: Fee 1»ct c1e:t1nI!8 "affcu:-da,bl$ houlling" a.s "hQu&in\j 
a£.fo):d~le to .families whose l.ncQl1\es cio "(It Q>(",eecl. tl>igh'!el' polore.en'l: (1I0tl) of l!nlll 
m-Clj"liIn 11.'1C!:Qme to%! the &el:'ilit::0 a1"O& 0): areas w1thin th.. jti:cilidic:tJ,oa. o! the 
qQV'''~nmental en.titlt'. Idaho Coda Ann. Ii 67-8203 (1) • Fw:tlle;mozolt, the liIQt de:t.ines 
"develol)lIIlUlt re~\lil.riilr .. ent" as ". re'l"5.r_en-e a"t'tacnec:l to .a cievelo.,msntal approva.l Ill: 
otber 9cv8rnmiiln~al aQt~On apprQ~in9 or .uthori~tns a particular development p&cject 
inC:.\.\I.c:U.ng, bUll not. l.ttnit:.ed. t.o, ill .l:'ez.oninq, which ):'eqW..t'liment cOlIlpels th. pallrrasnt, 
ded.iC:liltion or cont.ril:n:lt1on Of goods, servic.l!Is, la)'ld, or llIoney all a condition Q:f 
"P9%CllI'a1." lcl8ilCl CCde Arm. § 1$'~S:203! 10). Onclllr ,.actiao 6'1-8204. 
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Code- AM. § 151·8204. A develo,P1'llQt impact fee is ''Payment of money Imposed as a eonditiOl.~ Q 
development approval to pay for a plQpOrticmate share of tbe CQ$t of system improvements noeded to 
serve de"e1oprnen.r." IClal10 Code Alm. § 67·8203(9). Such feet "shall net ~ceed ap!:Qportiooate mare 
of the QOst of !)'steln improVmlentII." Idaho Coda Anll. § 67-8204(1). 
The critica! language in tbe tdaho DCMlopmeut Impact Pee Ac:t is that !he purpose of such ~ct 1 
to proVide funds nece.llsat;Y for "pl11l'lJl.iDs1. and fitwlcillil publio facilitie3 ueeded to serve new Sl'owth an 
development •.• tlecesSazy •• - to ptOlnote and aocQlUtllodate orcletly 8l'owth and development and. lo 
I protect the pu.blic health, safety and gen~al welfara." Idaho Cod= M»" § 61-8202. ,Public facilities liT 
de(1llOd a& water woril:a, waste facilities, roads, S1l'ee1:S, and bridges, storm water oollection, parks II.Il 
capital improvemenUi, sa wen. as ptlbUo safety facilities such ill! law C1l/oroem.em. fire; emergency 
medical BltQ. rescue and street lighting facilities. lllaho Code Ann.. § 67-8203(24). Ultimately, while th 
r~o 'Development Impact Pee Aot allows I1ll exception to imposing So develo-pment impaQt fee 01' 
atrordllbll1l housing, the AJ:;t does not co.ntemplate the imposition ot d~valopmBnt impact fees to ens 
i!Il1 adeq\:U/,te affordable houslng supply or to cU,lIe.lop such. T:berefote, this Court is uMble to cOllclude 
1\. c:levelClPll\ent :I.lnpact ~ee ord.inancl!! n:y 1i<X1!It\9t 6.11 or part Qf ill 
pa.t'1:~cu:J,ar de'Velcpmant project f.e>m c:leve:J.cp:nent impact: £eea prov1clClc:l. 
th~c 8UC~ prc~ect: ts dete~n4d to crG~tQ B£fc~d$ble houeinq, provi~c:I 
that the p~l~c policy Wh~ch supports the a~mpt~on 1a cont~ineQ 1n tne 
g'over/.llllent:al entity's clmPreh~nSiva plal'l and. prcvidQC thilt the exen\pt 
development" SO p:rCl?ortion.!ll:e sharp. of system i/llprC>'lfll!menl:s J.s !1)nd.ec1 
~hrou9h a ~evenue eO~d~ other than dovelepment impaCt ~ee81 
;Idaho Cede S 67-a204 (l.OI • ZssentiilLly, a. c:l.ty may p~o"'ide ill" ,incentive tQ~ t:ne 
c:reat.i.on o£ affordab.le bQus:l.nQ' by eltC!%!lpUr>g the cillve'lopma"t: impact!. fec, provide 
~l1at: l!IU~ e>:emptio:. 1& witM.n the city' e CQlIlPrei'lanaive plan and ~hl!lt l51Jch 
Ptopc~tionate ~hare of ey$~sm ~Np~ovementQ 1= funded through ~nather $o~r~e such eQ 
state or fe~eral Eundi~q of af~Q:dab~e hQUoinq. 
zf the fees imposed under O:r:dAntlnc:e: NOli. aU and BaO ere development ,1.ntpe.c.t eeea, 
SQc:h :l:ees wg~ld be contrary 1: .. 'the Il'tIIt:&d Leq;tal. ... 1;;ive .i.nt~n~:l.on to prQv1da B 
e""*'P";icm to the ilIIpQllit:l.on 01. !lUob. :6e811 un~r 11111<::1::5.0'" 67-9204 1!ol;; the davelcpmenl:: 
of ~ilo"'4Bbl& housing. 
~mc PEC:l:S:EOM .li:bl1) OllDEa. - l'AtD ~$ 
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"'" "'_ .... uubsidy undw """ ...... No. 819, '" ... ~ 0.11""". No •• 20,;' ..... ,.;'" J 
tb.fJ Idaho DsveIopmen~ )'mpact :Fee Act. 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Com in IdQho BuOdlnr Contl'actors A..fSliclalioll found that the 
fee imposed by the city's ord.i!'1a:llGe "purports to a$$ess a fee to suppon additional facilities or service 
made necessary by the development, ~ to snift the cost of those additional facilities and services from 
the public at lc!tge to the clevelopm.ent itself'," lei In IdJIho Building Contractors AS$oclaJion. the City 0 
Coeur D'Alt!:Q.e htJ4 enacted an QrdinflJl(:C wbich tequifed a capitalbllWOD fee to pay for a. propoTtlO!lll.te 
share of the cost of itnprovemellts needed to serve dev~lQpmen1. The cu:pitali2ation fee wu imposed 0 
all bUilding pemlits. in an atte1l1Pt to have gTowth pay fo\' growtb. Relying on tb.e analYsis in Brewster. 
the Court held: 
[T]he assellsment here is no different thm a oharge for the privilege of living in the Ci"ty 
of COWl d'Alene.. It is a .i)rtvllege shared. by the S~ public which utilizes the same 
facilities and. eervicc:s fJ& tholie p1.nciUlSIng building permits for new CXl.llSU"UClioll. 'me 
in1pal;t ;fee at issue here sm-es thf purpOIS g!pyo1l!4ing fjmdWg for plio 3,§1"JtAA,£ at 
lmll, B!YI nPI IQ th! indM4uql Q8lw'!g. end lherefAre tg e ts, The fact that adclltionaJ. 
t,tervlol:li are nllwe necessary by growth and development daes not cl1a:Jlge the essential 
nature oftbe services provided: they lire for the public at lBti,c. 
Idaho Hldg. Contrqc%()rs Ass 'If, l.2.6Ic1aho at 744, 890 1'.2d at 330 (c:mpbasill added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court digtinguislu!d taxes from. fees, stating that "t!U;cs serve. the purpose Q 
provid~n.i iimding for publio servioes at largol wbereas a fee serves only the pUTpose of coverJng the COs 
01' the particular servJee provided by the state to the lndividual," ld. (cit.i.u8 .4.lperr v. Saire Water Corp., 
118 Idaho 136. 145, 795 P.2d 298,307 (1990». Quoting the Bt6W$ter Court, the lcUlho Supreme Co 
aoknowled.gcd. its previous holdIng stating: 
It is only re&soDable and fair to requ.irc the busiuejlll, t1"1ffic, act, ot ~g that necessitates 
poIfoing to 'pay this expense. 1'0 do _0 has been Ulliformly Ulfhald by the courts. On Ihs 
other hand, rhis,power l'fUlJI nOI b$ re.'CJ7tBd to a.r /'J shield ot subtel'fugfJl linder whtch to 
B1I&lCr and eriforca Q l'~venuli/*rai~-ing ordinancll 01' statute. 
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Id (quotlng BrBW*tB1', 115 Idtlho lit 504, 7fJB 1".24 4Lt 767). In Idaho Building Co,m'acto!'" Associatiol1, 
tho Idaho Supreme Court affirJlled the district COUTt'5 dcciliiOIl holcling that the muniClipal ordlnanee 
imposing fees was not e.uthorized by the Developmtillt Impact Fee Act and that suob fee was essentially 
lax provIding :funding for public services at IBTge. Ed. at 743-44. 890 P.2d at 329-30. 
Likewi$e, the City of McCslJ is ~tt=lpting to have growth in McCIIi1 pay fot' growth. 
Esseu.t1ally.landownets and developers are being charaed II premitlm, by way of either a subsidy or a fol'l, 
to llve in tho City of McCaiI. There has been no suggestion that the Landowner or developer eAjoys some 
bWlefit,. othel than II. benefit ostenaibly to be reaJiacd by the public Ilt large, from payill3 the $ube.ic!y 0 
building permit tee uucI~ Ordi.o.u.ncc NOB. 819 IIlld 820.18 While the landowner or devoloper may b 
denied a permit to develop a subdlVision or bulld II. teSidential Ullit if he OT she fails to provide the 
subsidy or pa.y the.fee, the ~'benefit" he Or she: receives in subdividin& his or her land does not distingu' 
the subsidy or fee from a tax. A.dmittedly, the benefit p:rovidec1 is to assure "/1 :teasonable &\\'pply (1 
affordable, deed restricted worlctorce housing (c:om1'.QWlity housiD.g) being made IIVlIila'ble ••• [to] criticlI 
protllssional wor1ters, essential senoica persol3D.el, illld servic~ workers" who are able 1.0 live within 
proximi~ to their work, Whatever b~efit the landowner reoeives 1a no diffe.tent thml a benefit reaeivt! 
fIIld. shared by the pl\blic at large. The 1.sJ:)l( of affordable workforce hou.tring i!l Il. PTQblem fOT which th 
public should bear the cost to rem6d), tather thau impolliog the burc:11l11l on a few landowners 0 
,~ 'l'h" City of McCall atteJIIPts to nque th;l!t the blrneUt to the land.ownQ~ .lIS two-
fold: el) aElIiUranCe thai: "cl:'itiaal pl:ofl!!u1onal workers, ElIIIl1I!meu,l serviCe 
personnel and seu:vs.ce wo:rl\'s;r" live w.Lthil'l p.oll1mity to their work t.o p"ov.l. 
municipal and pr:l.vatG seotor IlCu:vic::ee;" and {jill inc:enUvel! $I.lch as d.endty bonu~ss, 
equity ~uilder p~Q9rams, and p:~¢~i~y in $swage and water bOOKU~S, The cenQfic 0 
eS$ential wo~~£o:ce 8Q~viC:QS ~~ • »a~e!i~ .ha~ed »y tno p~l~c a~ l~rg@, A$ eo thQ 
.\.1\~"Ilt::!.ves e lancCWl'1er recdves, sl~c:h inc:q,ntlves il;l:EI .not Qlearly Qutlinetl in tnll 
ordinance!; I:hamselvQIt and i:h.ill CQ"r:!: is not pa:lOsue.o.Bd tbat tOOl'!. incantive5 01.1" 
prov!deri in ellcnonqc for the sUbsidy or fees paid p~r8uant ~a Ord~nanaQ Nos. 819 ~n 
no. 
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d$velopeta. therefOre, the PUIpO!lIt of the silbsiay or fee U%lder OEdinanee 'Nos. 819 and 820 is fOl' t!l~ 
benefit of publio ellnrlees at larS" ratb.OJ' tb.ez! II. benefit to the individual assessed. 
The City of MoCalll.1l'ges tbs.t this CollIt'S amIysls, in d.eteml.ining whether the fe~ imposed n 
disguised taxes. should focus on whether the funds collected a.re dlablned in accoJdSllQe with the state 
purpose of the regulll:If.~. Howc:ver, this step in the ana.b'sis should cmne only !U!£ a determlnfttion that 
tb.e City ofMoCaJ.l1,ad 8.uthorit;y to impose sueh fees. In Loomis 11. C#y oj He;.fley, 119 Idaho 434, 1107 
P.2cl1272 (1991). and. also in Schmidt '1'. Village of Klmbdrly. 74 Idaho 48, 2S6 P.2d '15 (1953), thl1: 
; lduho Supreme Court tound. that the fees impllsed. v.rere collected. pursuant to the Idl'lho Revenue Boo 
Act. Under those ei~e6> the Court was reqa.ired to detormine whether the fees were collecte 
under the IPlise of1he Act IiUld allooated and lIpent otherwise Oll. projects not reJated to the ordillanue. 
Suoh is not the situation In the underlyins case. Therefore, UnJI:S!l the Court finds the fees impose 
under Ord.lzlal1ee Nos. 819 and 820 lire p1'opcrly enactJ;d pursuant to the City's poUoe "owen, it need not 
determine whether such ~s are bel.n.g properLy disbtrrscd in ac:corcWlCe with the stated P'"tpOlies 01 
. 1. Wlterber Qrdfn/ZlJt:s Noa.{tl.9 and 820 grB Utyga.umakle orArkilWJI 
Thll third prong 1lI1der Habbs is to detennlc.e whether: O~e No. 819 is a rcaso.nable oJ 
arbitrary e.o.ae1ment. 11I.e PIain.t.i.f'.l'DI'gues that Ordinance No. 819 operates lUi a TOguJatiun of ownetsb.i.l'l 
20 . rather than a lau.d use TegWation, A3 an otdiD.ance regoJating a landoW!lCr's ownership rather than use, It 
21 
22 
21 
25 
is an 81'bitratY ami um'08sonable elteroise of tlw police powers and violates tho OOJ.lStitutioaal pt'owotion 
given by the due process clause. Tho Plaintiff relies on 0 'Connt)r v. CUy of Mb8COW. 69 Idaho 37. 202 
P .2d 401 (1949), for the propo!1itioJl that a :ZO\li.ng ot4inil.llcc ttlJl.y o.lll.y regulate use, oot ownership, 0 
propelt)'. Ii. at 43, 202 P .2d at 404 ("A zoninB orctinsncc deal!! basically with the t.\8e, not ownersbip, c 
'ptOPeny·")· 
lP.!ENO~Ql( IlECISJ:O)i' AND 0Rl)1'ilJ. - PAGE 28 
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and second, those: wbich pmen"be the use 10 which buildings withln cettain designated disf:ricts mq b 
G pUt-II ld. at41, 202. P.2d a.t403. The city of Moscow atteJnpted to reEtdot eertafn businesses to OM 
5 gf the bJJSilles$ dis1ri~ in downtown by adopU.g an ordinanc~ that pzovld=!! any gba.:D.ge of ownership 
II would constitute a !WW or additional btlSiness. Therefore. my non.-collfomting busiD.ess wbi 
e 
9 
10 
attempted. to sell to a lJJeW owner would be prohibi~ ftom operating such bU&iness as it was a. «new 
additiOXllll" business. 
;!.3, ownership to be a nCW business was void u being an ar'bi1rary and llIlreaeonable exeroise of the eicy' 
12 police l'ower ~la.tinS the constitutional protections giV6l1 bytbe due process clause. Ttl. ~ 43, 202 P. 
14 
15 
16 
at 404. ByenactlDg an orWnance relati.ug to the business district and the uses ofprope:rty within certain 
limits of the city, the City of'MosCQW was regulating the use of suoh pl'O'Perties. However, attempting t 
make a change in ownersbip a ''!:leW bliS'l.ness" was arbilraty and unreasonable. 
residential or oomm=cW. HC)wevcr. the City of McCall'. re<l.ulJ;ement that twenty percent C1f ne 
u 
:.s subdivisions be deed-restricted as Clommunity hollliIlg regulates mu\OhJ:l:lOn) tbar.1 a Jandawnet'i ''ue'' 0 
.'2 a lrlA or he!: property. The restri.~tions for aommllllity h01lsin,g dictate the priDe for which the property xna: 
31 be solli and 10 whom the propenymay be sold. 2wn iftbe leliownor bllilds "enta1 units, the restrictions 
22 
23 
114 
25 
26 
that tw~1l1Y percent oftbc units be commtmity hou.sing alae tmUt hgw much rellt a landowner may charg 
and. to whom the u.cl.t& may be: JeIl(ed. These restrictions go much faxther than merely regulating the us 
of ~ jnsteaa. they eBse%lually regulate ownersllip of the propettY by dictating to wbom a unit 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1332095_34,10915·9 
Page 81 
3 
be sold. or rented This Court concludes such "regulalion" is arbitrary and. lUmlasonable as .. land us 
This Court is con.vim:ed that the bnpoaitiol1 of the su&aidy or fee reqWred. under Ordinal:lce Nas. 
819 and 1.20 are. in reality, a ~ aDd Jlat aNgulation, ~gh suoQ. o:rc:\inaJl.ccs. the City ofMoCall 
attempted to J)rOvide for Ilffords.ble housing eitber by requiting developen to P8¥ for auch by subsidl 
6 tbe housing mad:.et or ~y reql.llrlng lanc:1owners tc pay a eott.ml\UUty bfJusin, fee for new resi4el:ltial 
7 
8 
loll 
U' 
18 
20 
23 
25 
21i 
buUding pen:xdts. nero is noiUDg whicb regulates 1ht use oflmd. other than requirln$ a landowner to 
lief Mh 8llbsidy or fees. Tbere:fc:e, this Court finds thll't Ordinanoe Nos. 81~ and 820 i:rnpennissibl 
exceed the Cif;y'$ police powers as they impose !I. tax without legislative authority aUowinS the City 0 
McCllll to emu:t such we. Furthermore. to the ~ tbat aw;:h oxdillSJlcea att=pt to xegulaw ovomership 
(i.e. restricting a landowner's rlsitt tD sell or rent lots and Wli13 by l'stJ.\1iring affordable housing 
provisions). such ordinances aro arbiulltY au4 U!I1'e3SOnable. 
Given these ~luaions, there is no need to a.ddress the rcmaming issues or challenges by the 
Plaintiff of violation of tho Equal Protec:tioD. Cla.l.lSe, lha lmCortlti:tU1ional '4t.akiug" analysis, Qr the abil\~ 
orthe City QfMcCall to COl1tract with V ARHA. 
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:a 
3 
5 
6 
7 
a 
10 
12 
14 
1.5 
16 
:l.9 
20 
:<11 
22 
23 
;14 
2S 
26 
. i 
'I! . 
CO~CLU~JON 
For the foregoing reasons, thls Court hereby GRANTS ~: Plaintiff's. Motion for Summ 
J~dgatem, ilnding Cjty of McCall Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 exceed' the City of McCall's poll 
powers as ~ ptovide for unauthorized tB.'ltes and IUjl, therefore. "VOid and without force and.effect .. 
Counsel for Plaintiff aha1l Bllbmit any proposed judgm ents consistent with this deciaion, .subject to th 
tight of Defendant' s counsel to review for fonn. 
AND IT IS SO ORDEIUID •. 
Dated this 111fay of. ~. 20'08. 
Thomas F , Nev:il1o 
District Judge 
MliThl:OlU\NP1Jt4 DECISl:ON AND ORDER - l?AGlR 31 
.' 
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Appendix C SCHAEFER V. CITY OF SUN VALLEY 
RECEIVc:n 
JUL U 62007 
Givens PUrsley, LLP 
FILE 
I I 
Jo/ynn Drage. Clerk District 
Court Blame Couniy, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JlJDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLATh"E 
PHIL ANTI L Th"'N SCHAEFER, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
v. 
CITY OF SUN V ALLEY, IDAHO, a 
Political subdivision of the State ofIdaho 
DefendantiCounterclaimant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-06-882 
DECISION ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Phil and Lynn Schaefer Lane Ranch Partnership 
filed this lawsuit on October 18, 2007, challenging the City of Sun Valley's imposition of 
an in-lieu fee on the Schaefers, pursuant to Ordinance 364, the Workforce Linkage 
Ordinance. This matter came before the Court by Oral Argument on May 3,2007. 
Christopher Meyer appeared for and on behalf ofplaintiffs/counterdefendants Phil and 
Lynn Schaefer, and My. Rand Peebles and Geoffrey M. Wardle appeared for and 011 
behalf of the defendantlcounterclaimant the City of Sun Valley. The Court has discussed 
this matter at oral argument, reviewed the briefs, and conducted independent research on 
the matter, and renders the following decision. 
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FACTUALBACKGROD~D 
TIle following facts are undisputed. On April 21, 2005 the City of Sun Valley 
adopted Ordinance No. 363 and Ordinance No. 364. Both ordinances sought to address 
the gwwing need for affordable workforce housing in Sun Valley. Ordinance 363 applies 
to residential and multi-family deVelopment, and Ordinance 364, known as Workforce 
Housing Linkage Ordinance, applies to single-family construction. Ordinance 363 is not 
at issue in the present lawsuit. 
Ordinance 364 provides that all applications for Design Review in the City of Sun 
Valley "shall require an approved Workforce Housing Linkage Plan such that a 
percentage of the employee housing demand generated by the application will be 
provided as Workforce Housing Units." Sun Valley, Idaho Ordinance No. 364, § 9-9F-2. 
Permit approval for residential development requires the applicant to either "develop or 
ensure development of twenty percent (20%) ofthe employee housing unit demand 
generated by the application either onsite or on an Eligible Site prior to or concurrent 
with the issuance of any building peID1its for proposed new construction." Jd. at 9-9F-
4(B). The ordinance then sets forth a formula to compute the total on-site workforce 
housing units a home-builder must provide. The formula is based upon the size of the 
residential development, how many employees will be required, and how many 
employees will reside in a unit. 
Ordinance 364 also provides "[ w ]here alternatives to the on-site provision of such 
housing is determined to be more practical, efficient, and equitable, this Article will set 
forth standards for Eligible Site housing, the conveyance ofland, or a payment in-lieu 
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fee." Id. at § 9-9F-1. For instance, ifthe formula yields a fraction of a unit a home-
builder has the option to either build a full unit or pay a fee in-lieu. An in-lieu fee may 
also be provided where the City Council finds on-site housing to be inappropriate or 
impractical. Once collected, the fees must be deposited into a Workforce Housing Fund 
and used "solely to increase and improve the supply of rental and/or for sale workforce 
housing ... " 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Phil and Lynn Schaefer owned a lot in Sun Valley 
and sought to obtain design review approval and a building permit for a new home. The 
City assessed an "in-lieu" fee of $11,989.97 against the Schaefers pursuant to the 
Linkage Ordinance. The Schaefers filed this lawsuit and moved for summary judgment 
challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance 364. Sun Valley filed a counterclaim 
seeking a declaration that Ordinance 364 is a permissible constitutional exaction pursuant 
to the police power of Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is proper if the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 
56(c), LR.C.P. Ordinarily, the Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the 
non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 
808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). lfthe evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the 
trial court should grant the motion for summary judgment. Fann Credit Bank v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272,869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). The fact that both parties 
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move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321 
(1986). 
The parties appear to agree that no facts are at issue. 
ISSUES 
In the present case the primary issue is whether, as the City of Sun Valley argues, 
the in-lieu fees provided by Ordinance 364 are a proper exercise of authority under the 
police powers granted to municipalities by the Idaho Constitution. In the alternative, the 
City of Sun Valley argues that the Local Land Use Plauning Act (LLUP A) pro;rjdes the 
City with the authority to assess in-lieu fees for the purpose of affordable housing. In 
response, the Schaefers first argue that Ordinance 364 is an unconstitutional tax. 
Secondly, the Schaefers contend there is no legislation that permits the City to assess the 
in-lieu fee. Further, the Schaefers claim the only arguable legislation that would permit 
in-lieu fees would be the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act (IDIF A). IDIFA addresses 
the city's authority to assess charges on new growth and development, and importantly, 
does not allow the imposition of in-lieu fees for affordable housing. Therefore, the 
Schaefers claim, the IDIF A pre-empts the area of impact fee assessment. 
The Court will analyze both issues in tum. 
A.~ALYSIS 
At the outset, a brief review of the law regarding a municipality's authority to 
assess charges on the public is necessary. "Idaho has long recognized the proposition 
that a municipal corporation, as a creature of the state, possess and exercises only those 
powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it. This position, also Imown as "Dillon's 
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Rule," has been generally recognized as the prevailing view in Idaho." Caesar v. State, 
101 Idaho 158,610 P.2d 517, 520 (1980). (citations omitted). 
Consequently, there are three limited methods by which a municipality may 
impose charges 011 the public or particular persons. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Assoc. v. 
City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 540 (1995). Under Art. 12, § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution, a municipality may enact regulations pursuant to its police power, for the 
furtherance of the public health, safety or morals or welfare of its residents. Brewster v. 
City of Pocatello, 114 Idaho 502,503-504, 768 P.2d 765,766-67 (1988). Under its 
police powers, a municipality may "provide for the collection of revenue incidental to the 
enforcement of that regulation." Idaho Bldg. Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d 
at 329. 
Also pursuant to a municipality's police power, Art. 8 § 3 of the IdallO 
Constitution permits the imposition of rates and charges to provide revenue for public 
works projects. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 438,807 P.2d 1272, 1276 
(1991). Under this constitutional grant of authority, the Idaho Legislature enacted the 
Idaho Revenue Bond Act, which allows cities to vote to approve the issuance of revenue 
bonds to finance the cost or maintenance of public works. Jd. In the present action it is 
undisputed that Sun Valley did not attempt to hold an election to provide a bond to 
finam;e:: affordable housing. 
Finally, a municipality may assess charges on the public pursuant to specific 
legislation permitting a municipality to fund a particular project through the assessment 
oftaxes or fees. !d. This municipal authority arises from Art 7, § 6 of the Idaho 
Constitution, which "allows the legislature to invest in the corporate authorities ... the 
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power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of the corporation." Sun Valley Co. v. 
City a/Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427, 708 P.2d 147, 150 (1985). This grant of 
authority however, is not self-executing. A municipality may only exercise tlus taxing 
power pursuant to, and limited by the authority granted by the legislature. 
The first issue of contention is the scope of authority possessed by municipalities. 
The City of Sun Valley claims a municipality's authority is much broader than Dillon's 
rule, whereby a city's exercise of authority is only improper if it conflicts with the 
general laws ofthe state. Therefore, the City may enact Ordinance 364 so long as it does 
not conflict with the state's general laws. The City cites the recent Supreme Court 
decision of Plummer v. City a/Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 87 P.3d 297 (2004), as support 
for this proposition. When considering a municipality's police power, the Court in 
Plummer stated that, "the burden falls upon the party challenging the exercise of this 
power to show that such an exercise is either in conflict with the general laws of the state 
or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 813. 
While the City is correct that Plummer does set forth the law for a municipality's 
police power, a municipality's authority to tax requires separate authority. A City's 
police power does not authorize a city to tax the public, but rather regulate the public and 
in some instances assess a fee incidental to the regulation. As the Court recently made 
clear in Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water District, "a municipaJ 
corporation's taxes on the general public require specific legislative authorization." 141 
Idaho 678, 681, P.3d 8, 11 (2005). Therefore, the distinction lies in whether a city has 
imposed a general tax, in which specific authorizing legislation is required, or acted 
pursuant to their police power, where a broader grant of authority exists. 
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The second issue that must be resolved prior to the assessing the constitutionality 
of Ordinance 364 regards the difference between a tax and an exaction. The Ci ty spends 
a considerable amount oftime arguing that the in-lieu fee is an exaction rather than an 
impact fee. The import of this argument is two-fold; first, that an exaction is 
constitutionally distinct from a fee, and second, because the in-lieu fee is an exaction 
rather than an impact fee, LLlJPA doesn't apply. The City, however, cites no Idaho law 
supporting these propositions and this Court can find none. The analysis is the same 
whether it is labeled fee or an exaction. A municipality may regulate within its police 
collect revenue if it is incidental to the enforcement of that regulation. Brewster, 115 
Idaho 504. The first requirement is whether the municipality may lawfully regulate 
pursuant to their police power. If the regulation fails to satisfy this requirement, then the 
Court need not address whether the revenue is incidental to the regulation. Here, the 
regulation is an ordinance requiring development to mitigate its effect on the housing 
market. The revenue at issue is an in-lieu fee, Vlhether the revenue is labeled an 
exaction or an in-lieu fee does not remove it from the requirements of a valid exercise of 
police power, 
With regard to the argument that an in-lieu fee is an exaction and not an impact 
fee, and therefore LLUP A is inapplicable, the Court's holding is the same. The label is 
not the distinguishing faG lor. The question is whether the Idaho Legislature has 
specifically authorized the collection of revenue. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, 
whether the charge is labeled an in-lieu fee or an exaction is inconsequential. 
l. Ordinance 364 is not a lawful exercise of the City of Sun Valley's Police 
Power. 
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The City of Sun Valley argues that Ordinance 364 is merely a "regulation of 
development to ensure that new development adequately mitigates its effect on the supply 
of affordable workforce housing," and as such, falls within a city's established police 
power authority to regulate for the furtherance ofthe public health, safety or morals or 
welfare of its residents. Further, since a municipality may impose fees incidental to 
police power regulation, charging an in-lieu fee is permissible. The Schaefers argue that 
Ordinance 364 is nothing more than a general tax, and thus requires specific legislative 
authorization. 
A municipality's police power arises from the Idaho Constitution, Art. XII, § 2, 
which provides: 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in contlict with its charter or with the general 
laws. 
As stated above, pursuant to a municipality's police power, a city may provide for 
a fee incidental to the enforcement of that regulation. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, P.2d at 
767. The funds generated must "bear some reasonable relationship to the cost of 
enforcing the regulation." Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d at 329. 
However, jfthe regulation'S purpose is to raise revenue rather than regulate, it is a tax, 
and may only be upheld under the power of taxation. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
cautiously reviews whether the collection of revenue is incidental to the enforcement of 
that regulation, to cnsure that the police power is not "resorted to as a shield or 
subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or statute." Id, 
Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,118 P.2d 721 (1941). 
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In BrelVster v. City of Pocatello, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the difference 
between a fee and a tax. Generally, the Court considered a fee as revenue incidental to 
police power regulations, and a tax to include ordinances enacted for the purpose of 
raising revenue. See generally Brewster, 504 Idaho at 502, 768 P.2d at 676. In that case, 
the Court held invalid an ordinance that imposed a charge for the restoration and 
maintenance of streets on alI owners or occupants of property in the city, as an 
unconstitutional tax. The charge was calculated pursuant to a formula reflecting the 
traffic estimated by that particular property. Id at 502. Initially, the Court noted that the 
ordinance had no terms of regulation. TIle Court compared the alleged "fee" to a fee 
upheld in Foster's Inc. v. Boise City as an example of a revenue incidental to a valid 
police power regulation. In Foster's, the operation of parking meters was found to be 
incidental to the city's police power to regulate traffic and parking. However, the Court 
found the revenue from the Pocatello ordinance had "no necessary relationship to the 
regulation of travel over its streets, but rather [was] to generate funds for the non-
regulatory function ofrepairing and maintaining streets." Id. at 504. 
In other cases distinguishing a fee from a tax, the Idall0 Supreme Court has placed 
emphasis on the terms ofthe ordinance regarding who will benefit from the revenue 
collected, whether it be the particular consumer or the public at large. In Idaho Building 
Confractors A,ssoc. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 126 Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995), the 
Court reviewed a case with facts similar to the present case, where contractors challenged 
an ordinance that required payment of impact fees from new builders to pay for the cost 
of development as a precondition to the receipt of a building pennit. The Contractors 
claimed that the City lacked authority to collect the fees without authorizing legislation, 
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and the City defended its ordinance by arguing the fee was a valid exercise of police 
power. In differentiating a fee from a ta.'(, the Court defined a fee as "a charge for direct 
public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by 
the public at large to meet public needs." 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d at 330. The Court 
held the charge to be a tax because it benefited all those who live in Coeur d'Alene 
equally, yet only newcomers were responsible for the cost. Id. As the Court stated "[t]he 
fact that additional services are made necessary by growth and development does not 
change the essential nature of the services provided: they are for the public at large." Id. 
Similarly, in Brewster, the Court viewed the street fee to be a charge on the occupants or 
owners of property for the privilege having a public street abut their property, which is no 
different from a privilege shared by the general public in the usage of public streets. 
Bre'wster, 1151daho at 504,768 P.2d at 767. 
The Court in IBCA also expressed concern that the revenues collected pursuant to 
the ordinance were paid into a general fund to be used "for capital improvements 
throughout the City by all residents, and not solely for the benefit of those seeking the 
building permit." Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 330,890 P.2d at 330. 
Because those funds were not earmarked for use based on the demand created by 
development, they could not possibly relate to any specific regulation, but rather raise 
revenue for all public facility infrastructure. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has found ordinances requiring payment for water 
services to be a valid exercise of a municipality's police power. In Loomis v. City of 
Hailey, the Court found fees valid under the city's police power that were segregated and 
used to repair and replace water system components used by the city. 119 Idaho 434, 807 
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P.2d 1272 (1991). Again in Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water 
District, the Court found the purpose ofwater and sewer districts are to "serve a public 
use and promote health, safety, prosperity, security and general welfare of the inhabitants 
of said district." 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8 12 (2005). The Court found the fee to 
be used toward the water district's system and reasonably and rationally related to the 
purpose of the city's regulatory function of "insuring clean and safe water for those users 
of the district's system." !d. Thus the ordinance was upheld the by the Court. 
In the present case, this Court finds that the purpose of Ordinance 364 is more 
similar to a general tax than a fee because its clear purpose is to raise revenue rather than 
regulate. In order for an ordinance to regulate, it must exercise some control by a rule or 
a restriction. Blacks Law Dictionary (ih) 2000. For example, in Foster's the Court 
found that operating the parking meters was an essential part of the city's authority to 
control traffic and parking. In contrast, in Brewster the Court found the street fee was not 
tailored to control anything regarding streets, but raise revenue for maintenance and 
repair of the streets. Similarly, Ordinance 364 is not designed to exercise control or 
regulate the building of community housing, but merely generates revenue. 
Sun Valley also argues that it would be inconsistent to prohibit in-lieu fees while 
allowing restrictions on development with regard to off-street parking, setback and height 
regulations, and provide for on-site and off-site improvements necessitated by new 
growilL The Court finds nothing inconsistent with the above scenario. It is well settled 
that municipalities are able to regulate development. Setbacks and height regulations are 
valid regulations of a city's police power. Sprenger, Grubb and Associates v. City of 
Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). Furthermore, municipalities have been 
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legislatively authorized to enact zoning regulations pursuant to the Local Land Use 
Plru1l1ing Act. Parking restrictions are proper regulations under the city's recognized 
police power to regulate traffic and parking. The in-lieu fees assessed in Ordinance 364, 
as discussed above, do not assess fees incidental to police power regulations, but instead 
generate revenue. 
As stated above, another factor in establishing whether Ordinance 364 '5 in-lieu 
fee is a tax, is determining who will benefit. As Brewster stated, generally a tax benefits 
the public at large and a fee is payment by a particular consumer for a public service. 
According to Sun Valley, Ordinance 364 seeks to address the lack of workforce housing 
in the Wood River Valley, and its effect on local employer's ability to attract and retain 
employees. Memo in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Schaefers' Motion for Summary Judgment, pA. It is 
clear that the benefit of the ordinance serves new home-builders and the general public 
equally. This Court crumot distinguish this situation from the one that existed in 
Brewster or Idaho Building Contractors Association, where the Court stated "the 
assessment here is no different than a charge for the privilege of living in the City ... " 
Similar to Brewster, where the City utilized a fOffilUla to determine the amount ofthe 
charge based on the traffic estimated by that particular property, the City of Sun Valley 
attempts to distinguish Ordinance 364 from a general tax by including a formula to 
calculate the amount of the fee for each home-builder to ensure the builder does not bear 
an inordinate amount of the cost. Despite the city's effort, the problem remains. The 
lack of workforce housing, like the improvement of city streets, has an effect on the 
public, and thus the public should bear the cost. As the Supreme COUlt stated in Idaho 
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Building Contractors Assoc., "the fact that additional services are made necessary by 
growth and development does not change the essential nature of the services provided: 
they are for the public at large." 126 Idaho at 744,890 P.2d 330 . 
• A.s an alternative argument, the City then asserts that there is a particular benefit 
received by the Schaefers, which is the relief from constructing and dedicating a 
complete workforce housing unit as required by the Ordinance. By paying the in-lieu fee, 
the City claims, the Schaefers are saving money by paying Sun Valley to assume the 
costs associated with workforce housing. The City is likely correct. However, the City's 
options really only provide one feasible selection to the average person. The alternative 
options, such as on-site housing, eligible site housing or a conveyance of land to 
Workforce Housing, are all unrealistic to the average applicant. For example, ifthe 
formula calculating the number of units the applicant shall provide produces a fractional 
number, either the applicant must build an entire unit, or pay an in-lieu fee. Further, if 
the P8;Z finds on-site housing to be impractical or inappropriate, or that it would be more 
practical for the requircd units to be pooled with housing units from other projects in the 
City, or a more viable project may be constructed elsewhere, then an applicant may either 
pay an in-lieu fee or convey another piece of property. Ord. 364, § 9-9F-4.D. However, 
the conveyance of land option is only possible if (1) the applicant owns another piece of 
property in Sun Valley, and (2) the property is properly zoned, (3) the valuc ofthe 
property is enough to offset the City'S development costs, and finally (4) the proposal is 
accepted by the Sun Valley City Council. In addition, the developer must appraise the 
property, and the City may require, prior to approval, that the property contain roads, 
water supply, sewage disposal, an environmental report and other basic services. Ord. 
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364, 9-9F-4.D.2. Due to the numerous obstacles an applicant would confront by 
choosing any other alternative options, the City has effectively required an applicant to 
pay an in-lieu fee. Consequently, it is unreasonable to claim that Schaefers have received 
the benefit of not being required to choose the other three options. 
Sun Valley's claims that Ordinance 364 does not suffer from the same flaws as 
Idaho Building Contractors Association because Ordinance 364 specifically segregates 
and allocates the in-lieu fees, and limits their use to fund the workforce housing created 
by the new development. The Court agrees that the ordinance does not fail in this regard. 
As stated above, the Court in Idaho Building Contractors Association partially based its 
invalidation of the Coeur d'Alene ordinance on the fact that the fees were accumulated 
into a general fund. The Court was concerned that an impact fee could be assessed and 
the benefit would go toward an unrelated public need. Here, Ordinance 364 serves only 
to mitigate the portion of the demand for affordable workforce housing directly caused by 
the new development. Revenue provided from in-lieu fees are to be deposited into an 
interest bealing Workforce Housing Fund, and solely used to "increase and improve the 
supply of rental andlor for sale workforce housing affordable to moderate and low 
income households and whose income is derived from employment within Sun Valley or 
when found appropriate by the City, employed in Blaine County commonly known as the 
NOlth Valley, including the City of Kctchum and River Run." Ordinance, 364, § 9-9F-
4B.D.1. Although Ordinance 364 satisfies this one component of a valid police power 
regulation, it fails on the grounds discussed above. 
This Court finds, therefore, that the Ordinance 364 in-lieu is in reality an 
imposition of a tax, and not a valid exercise of a municipality's police power. 
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I. The City's charge of an in-lieu fee pursuant to Ordinance 364 is not 
specifically autborized by the Idabo Legislature. 
As discussed above, a municipality may also impose taxes or fees on the public by 
specific authorization from the Idaho legislature. Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc,126 
Idaho at 742, 890 P.2d 328. Therefore, the only proper question for this Court is whether 
any specific authorization from the legislature exists. The City of Sun Valley identifies 
the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LUJPA") as the source ofthe City's authority. The 
Schaefers argue that Ordinance 364 is without legislative authorization. The Schaefers 
further contend that Ordinance 364 is preempted by Idaho law, particularly the Impact 
Fee Act. 
The Schaefers' argument is two fold. First, the Idaho LegiSlature did not 
specifically authority the City to assess in-lieu fees. Second, the IDIF A preempted the 
area of impact fees, and therefore the City could not assess in-lieu fees. Here, the Court 
need not proceed to Schaefer's second argument on preemption at this time. The 
question to address is whether the Idaho Legislature specifically authorized a 
municipality to assess fees or taxes for affordable housing. If so, the ordinance would be 
upheld on that basis. If no I egislative authority exists, then no preemption argument is 
necessary because the state did not grant specific authorization to the city. 
Furthermore, preemption generally serves as a limitation of authority granted to 
municipalities by the Idaho Constitution. Caesar, 101 Idaho at 161. "The city cannot act 
in an area which is so completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter 
of state concem. Nor may it act in an area where, to do so, would conflict with the state's 
general laws." Id. For instance, a city's police power is limited in areas where the State 
has either directly preempted an ordinance or preempted the field. The Schaefers appear 
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to concede that the preemption argument would apply only if the Court found Ordinance 
364 to be a proper exercise of a municipality's police power. Only then could it be 
argued that the State has preempted the area of impact fees, and the city is prohibited 
from acting in that field. Since this Court found Ordinance 364 to be outside the 
authority of a municipality's police power, the Court need not dee ide whether IDIF A 
preempted the ordinance. Therefore, since it is undisputed that IDIF A does not provide 
the necessary authority from the legislature, the Court viilI focus on the LLUP A 
The City defends Ordinance 364 by arguing that LLUP A provides the authority 
necessary for a municipality to assess in-lieu fees for affordable housing. This Court 
crumot find that LLUP A provides the City with any such authority. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed other challenges to County ordinances 
where the County defended by identifying a specific grant of authority by the legislature. 
One such lawsuit, Kootenai County Property Ass 'n v. Kootenai County involved a 
municipality's attempt to charge the public fees to establish, maintain and operate a solid 
waste disposal system. In that case the Court upheld the assessment of fees on the basis 
that the Idaho legislature permitted the municipality to fund a particular project through 
the assessment of taxes or fees. 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989). The legislation at 
issue was entitled Solid Waste Disposal Sites, Title 31, Chapter 44, which grrulted county 
commissioners the authority "to acquire, establish, maintain and operate such solid waste 
disposal systems as are necessary and to provide reasonable and convenient access to 
such disposal systems by all the citizens." le. § 31-4402. Further, the statute provides 
the board of county commissioners the following options to fund the waste disposal 
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system: levy a tax, collect fees, use existing revenues, or collect money from any other 
source, or any combination thereof. I.C. § 31-4404(1). 
In contrast, the City of Sun Valley fails to point to any language in the Local Land 
Use Planning Act that specifically grants authority to assess fees or taxes. It is evident 
from the Solid Waste Disposal Sites Act that the legislature provides revenue collection 
authority with specific language. In contrast, the City of Sun Valley cites the Court to 
several sections of LLUP A as support for the legislature's broad grant of authority. 
These sections provide cities with the authority to promote the general welfare of the 
people ofIdaho by identifying and assessing the need for affordable housing, and 
requiring cities to address such issues by implementing regulations and standards. I.e. § 
67-6508, I.C. § 67-6511. Indeed, LLUP A provides a city with broad authority to regulate 
in the context ofland use. However, notably absent from LLUP A is language permitting 
a city to assess taxes or fees. 
Further, it is not at all clear that Ordinance 364 is of the type that LLLJP A applies 
to. "LLUP A establishes explicit and express procedures to be followed by the goveming 
boards or commissions when considering, enacting and amending zoning plans and 
ordinances." Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 119, 90 
P.3d 340,344 (2004). Further, zoning regulations "are divided into two classes; first, 
those which regulate the height and bulk of buildings within ccrtain designated districts, 
and second, those which prescribe the use to which buildings within certain designated 
district may be put." 0 'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949). 
The standards listed in the LLUP A are consistent with the above definition of zoning 
regulations, listing "such things as building design; blocks, lots, and tracts ofland; yards, 
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courts, greenbelts, planting strips, parks, and other open spaces; trees; signs; parking 
spaces; roadways, streets, lanes, bicycIeways, pedestrian walkways, rights-of-way, 
grades, alignments, and intersections; lighting; easements for public utilities; access to 
streams, lakes, and viewpoints; water systems; sewer systems; storm drainage systems; 
streets numbers and names; house numbers; schools, hospitals, and other public and 
private development." I.C. § 67-6518. The common theme of the above standards is the 
regulation of land use. Ordinance 364 does not impose standards related to the 
regulation ofland use, but rather seeks to impose fees upon landowners seelcing a 
building permit. 
In sum, the Court cannot find that the LUJP A specifically grants the City of Sun 
Valley the authority to assess fees or taxes on the public. Therefore, Ordinance 364 
cannot be upheld on the basis that the City of Sun Valley may assess an in-lieu fee 
pursuant to specific legislative authorization. 
IDAHO TORT CLAIM ACT 
The Schaefers seek a refund of the $11,989.97 in-lieu fee pursuant to the Idaho 
Tort Claim Act, I.e. § 6-901 to 6-929. The City claims no refund is due because the city 
acted "without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in 6-904C, Idaho Code." 
I.C. § 6-904A. This Court carmot find that the City of Sun Valley enacted Ordinance 364 
willfully or recklessly, and therefore denies any refund pursuant to this act. 
Tile Schaefers also seek a refund on the basis that the state was unjustly enriched 
by receipt of an unconstitutional tax. The Court in BHA Investments, inc., v. State, 138 
Idaho 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474,481 (2003), acknowledged such a claim may be appropriate 
where the state charges an unconstitutional fee. A claim of unjust emichment requires 
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(1) a benefit is conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2) appreciation by the defendant of 
the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof. 
Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,133 P.3d 1211 (2006). In the present action, the 
City collected and appreciated receipt of$11,989.97 from the Schaefers. Further, as a 
result of this Courts ruling regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance, acceptance of 
the charge by the City would be inequitable. Thus, this Court finds the City to have been 
unjustly emiched in the amount of$11,989.97 and the Schaefers are HEREBY entitled to 
a refund in that amount. 
In conclusion, because Ordinance 364 is not a valid exercise of a municipality's 
police power, nor specifically authorized pursuant to a specific legislative enactment, the 
Schaefer's Summary Judgment is HEREBY GRA."-lTED, and thus the City of Sun 
Valley's Summary Judgment is DE};1ED. 
It is so ordered. 
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